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THE CONVERGENCE OF MEDIA, CANDIDATE, AND PUBLIC AGENDAS AS 
PREDICTORS OF VOTER CHOICE 
 
JONATHAN M. SIMON 
ABSTRACT 
 This thesis examined the role of agenda setting effects in creating conditions that 
could predict vote choice within the context of the 2010 general election in Cuyahoga 
County, Ohio. This survey utilized a mail survey sent to independent voters to measure 
the public agenda and thorough content analyses of local television news, the major local 
newspaper, candidate television advertisements and candidate websites to measure the 
media and candidate agendas. These agendas were compared using an innovative 
convergence score which reported the percent similarity between any two given agendas. 
 This thesis found that relationships do exist between agenda convergence and 
vote choice and suggests the possibility of a model that could direct campaign activities. 
While this research focuses on the aggregate, campaign level, the methodologies and data 
herein may be used to examine complex individual level processes of political influence.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE 
 Every year voters in the United States go to the polls to participate in the 
American democratic process and every year, in the weeks and months leading up to the 
election, political candidates spend seemingly countless dollars and hours campaigning 
with the sole purpose of winning the election. Driven to understand the processes through 
which campaigns affect voter choice during elections, political scientists and 
communication scholars began to delve into the field of political communication in the 
1940‟s (McCombs, 2004).  
 As political communication research evolved, researchers began to look into the 
media‟s role in changing the opinions of voters, with inconclusive results (e.g., Berelson, 
Gaudet, & Lazarsfeld, 1948; Trenamen & McQuail, 1961); however a byproduct of this 
research did yield strong evidence that the media play a role in educating voters about the 
issues in a campaign (e.g., McCombs & Shaw, 1972). These developments led McCombs 
and Shaw to their famous Chapel Hill study of the 1968 presidential election which 
identified the agenda setting function of the media, finding that the mass media influence 
the public agenda by giving a higher salience to certain issues which are then transferred 
to the public agenda (McCombs & Shaw, 1972).  
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 Since Chapel Hill, over 400 studies have been conducted by researchers around 
the world looking at the agenda setting function of the media. This research has found not 
only that there is a consistently replicable agenda setting effect, but also that agenda 
setting is not confined to the media and public agendas (McCombs, 2005). The research 
has shown agenda setting occurs among a wide array of agendas including the party, 
candidate, corporate, and policy agendas (Fremlin, 2008; Roberts, 1992; Young, 2004; 
Yue & Weaver, 2009). There is also strong evidence for inter-media and inter-candidate 
agenda setting in which the agenda of one media outlet or candidate influences another 
media outlet or candidate (Dunn, 2009).  
1.1 Purpose 
 Since its inception, agenda setting research has focused primarily on the idea of 
issue salience transfer from one agenda to another (McCombs, 2005). Wanta and 
Ghanem (2006) conducted a meta-analysis of 90 empirical studies, finding a mean 
Pearson‟s r of +.53, and the meta-analysis of 29 studies performed by Chen and Lasorsa 
(2008) found a mean correlation of +.76. These meta-analyses provide extremely strong 
support that salience transfer does occur regularly in a variety of situations. 
 With strong support for the existence of agenda setting, researchers are expanding 
the arenas in which the agenda setting function can be studied from social, athletic, and 
religious groups as agenda setters to the internet and its blogs, web pages, and social 
networking sites as channels that can change the ability of one agenda to transfer salience 
to another (McCombs, 2005). Unfortunately, while these areas are certainly deserving of 
attention, one of the original core concerns of political communication researchers has 
gone largely ignored.  
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 While early political communication research focused on the media‟s ability to 
change attitudes in a campaign, agenda setting research has avoided the topic in favor of 
better understanding the process of and conditions necessary for salience transfer to occur 
(McCombs & Shaw, 1972; McCombs, 2005). Only a few studies have been conducted 
using the existence of agenda setting to extend the research that explains and predicts 
behaviors of the groups that are on the receiving end of salience transfer; four of these 
studies are identified below.  
 In 1986, a study was conducted on the agenda setting effects on the electoral 
preference of voters in West Germany based on the media coverage of political issues 
(Brosius & Kepplinger, 1992). This study found that media coverage “had a significant 
influence on the electorate‟s party leanings in seven of 64 potential cases… [taking 
account for] the influence of the traditional party links” (Brosius & Kepplinger, 1992, p. 
900).  
 In the 1990 Texas gubernatorial election, a similar study sought to use the issue 
salience among voters as a predictor of voter choice (Roberts, 1992). In this study, 
Roberts found that rank-order similarities in issue salience between voters and candidates 
were capable of predicting voter choice 70% of the time; however, this relationship was 
only significant for a subset of issues, leading Roberts to conclude that “the total agenda 
of [public] concerns…is not relevant to the vote on election day” (Roberts, 1992, p. 889). 
 More recently, research during the 2000 Presidential election found that candidate 
salience, defined as the proportion of media coverage of one candidate versus media 
coverage of all candidates, is significantly correlated with polling preference over time, 
with a standardized regression coefficient of β=.48 (Young Jun & Weaver, 2005). In the 
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context of Israeli national elections, researchers found a significant correlation (β=.27) 
between opinions of the most important issue on the agenda and voting intentions; 
however, this study did not find significant aggregate level results (Sheafer & Weimann, 
2005).  
1.2 Significance 
 Given the limited nature of research in this area, it is important to further 
investigate and develop the predictive capacity of agenda setting research within the 
context of modern American political campaigns. While there is evidence that American 
voter behavior can be predicted using certain aspects of the media, candidate, and public 
agenda (Roberts, 1992; Young Jun & Weaver, 2005), there is no study that looks at the 
relationship as a whole. While Young Jun and Weaver found a significant correlation 
between the media‟s agenda of candidate issues and polling preference, their study did 
not take into account policy issues or the public agenda. By omitting these two crucial 
items, their study was unable to provide a complete picture of the media agenda and 
unable to make any direct claims relating the agenda setting function of the media to 
voter preference. 
 Roberts‟ (1992) research had the advantage of looking at a wide array of issues on 
the media, candidate, and public agendas, thereby making her study similar to the present 
study; however, there are a few key weaknesses to the Roberts study. First, Roberts used 
a rank-order measure of agenda that washes out subtle differences and amplifies large 
differences in the salience of issues. The use of ordinal measurement of agendas in 
Roberts‟ study damages the precision of the agenda and could be responsible for her 
finding that the total agenda does not affect the vote.  
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 Both Sheafer and Weimann, and Brosius and Kepplinger‟s studies took place in a 
markedly different context from American elections. In both the Israeli and West German 
elections voters elect a party rather than a candidate; however, agenda setting research 
has been found to be generalizable and replicable across various electoral constructs 
(McCombs, 2005); therefore, the results of these studies can be used as a reference point 
for this research. While the West German study looked at the public agenda and the 
media agenda as a predictor of voter preference, it didn‟t measure the party agenda 
(Brosius & Kepplinger, 1992). Because Brosius and Kepplinger didn‟t measure the 
salience of the issues on the party platform, it prevents their research from suggesting a 
relationship between campaign behavior and voter preference. Their focus exclusively on 
the media agenda allows the agenda setting function of the media to explain voter choice, 
but it offers no insight into how this relationship can be used to predict it. 
 Sheafer and Weaver‟s study was exploratory in nature and as a result 
oversimplified the measurement of the party agendas. Despite the fact that Israeli 
elections are multi-party in nature, the study divided the parties into two groups based on 
whether the most prominent issue in the party platform was based on security issues or 
economic issues (Sheafer& Weaver, 2005). Because party agendas were so diluted for the 
purposes of the study, it is almost impossible to determine if the overall similarities 
between party, public, and media agendas are significant predictors of voter preference.  
 This current study aims to address these weaknesses in a variety of ways. In 
addressing the issue of the inherent lack of precision of a rank-order agenda and then 
comparing a comprehensive analysis of the media, public, and candidate agendas with 
voter choice, this study will attempt to build a predictive model of voter choice based on 
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the effects of agenda setting. In so doing, this study will draw upon the cross-disciplinary 
nature of political communication and agenda setting research by utilizing theory and 
methodology from the political science field to provide a deeper insight into the decision 
making process of voters in elections. 
 This current study will also be distinctive in the communication field in that it will 
focus exclusively on registered independent voters, thereby washing out the mitigating 
factor of strong partisanship in measurements of both voter choice and the public agenda. 
Because of these factors, this study may be able to identify a new campaign tactic for 
political campaign advisors and consultants to reliably influence the independent vote 
using a combination of the media and campaign messages.  
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CHAPTER II 
CONCEPTUALIZATION 
2.1 Agenda Setting Theory 
 Agenda setting theory is the basis of this study. The theory was best and most 
succinctly summarized by Cohen when he said, “the press „may not be successful much 
of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its 
readers what to think about‟” (as cited in McCombs & Shaw, 1972, p. 177). In essence 
what this means is that the agenda of issues covered in the media will have a high 
positive correlation with the public agenda (McCombs, 2004). As agenda setting 
expanded as a field, researchers no longer limited their study to media and public 
agendas; they now examine candidate, policy, corporate, and party agendas as well. For 
the purposes of this study, however, the focus will be on candidate, media, and public 
agendas. In order to understand the relationships between these agendas, one must 
understand what an agenda is, what makes an agenda, and how agenda setting as a 
process works.  
 In simple procedural terms, agenda setting is suggested to work in the following 
manner:  
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The media emphasize certain issues in their coverage of politics by devoting a 
greater proportion of the news hole to them or by placing them more prominently 
in the newspaper or newscast. This emphasis on issues in the media, in turn, 
influences the salience of these issues among the audience (Sei-Hill, Scheufele, & 
Shanahan, 2002, p. 7). 
In this procedural model, media-public agenda setting is described; however, in each of 
the permutations of agenda setting theory the same basic process occurs in which one 
agenda gives extra attention to a set of issues in their communication channels, and that 
extra attention leads to an increased salience of those issues in the agenda of the person or 
organization on the receiving end of these messages.  
2.1.1 Agendas 
 The most crucial element of agenda setting theory is the concept of an agenda. 
Agendas have been defined in a variety of ways; political scientists Cobb and Elder 
(1983) view an agenda as “a general set of political controversies that will be viewed at 
any point in time as falling within the range of legitimate concerns meriting the attention 
of the polity” (as cited in Dearing & Rogers, 1996, p. 2). Dearing and Rogers themselves 
define agendas in a communication context as “a set of issues that are communicated in a 
hierarchy of importance at a point in time” (1996, p. 2). While Dearing and Rogers define 
agenda at a point in time, they acknowledge that agendas will change over time as issues 
rise and fall in their hierarchical rank of importance; they argue that agendas can only be 
viewed as a “snapshot of this fluidity” (1996, p. 2).  Zhu (1992) attempts to explore the 
ability of agendas to change over time, arguing that an agenda must be a zero-sum 
agenda, wherein as one issue rises in prominence another must fall. Zhu‟s research 
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spurred the question of how large an agenda can be, the finding showed variability in the 
size of a valid agenda with the number of issues ranging from as few as five to as many 
as 10 issues per agenda (McCombs & Zhu, 2005).  
 For the purposes of this study, all of these perspectives will be taken into account 
in defining the general term “agenda.” In this study the agenda is defined as a zero-sum 
hierarchical set of between five and 10 issues that receive attention from the entity to 
which the agenda is ascribed. 
2.1.1.1 The Media Agenda 
 The media agenda is a specific type of agenda, one that is quite central to agenda 
setting research. The vast majority of agenda research treats the media agenda as the 
independent variable, though some studies over the last decade have looked at media 
agendas as dependent on other factors (Dunn, 2009). There are several different channels 
which could be considered vehicles of the media agenda, as Cohen‟s definition stated 
earlier in this paper shows; early agenda setting research focused on newspapers almost 
exclusively (McCombs & Shaw, 1972).  However, as technology has made it much easier 
to perform content analyses of television news, both channels have been included in the 
definition of the media agenda; in fact some researchers have treated television as the 
sole owner of the media agenda (e.g. Brosius & Kepplinger, 1992). 
 Research has been conducted on which forms of media have a stronger agenda 
setting effect; the research has shown that the print media, newspapers and online 
newspapers, are both more effective in producing an agenda setting effect and in 
reflecting the candidate‟s agenda than television (Ridout & Mellen, 2007; Roberts, 1992).  
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 Therefore, to achieve a comprehensive media agenda, for the purposes of this 
study the media agenda is defined as the zero-sum hierarchical set of between five and 10 
issues that receive attention in newspapers and television news programming. 
2.1.1.2 The Public Agenda 
 The public agenda has been conceptualized in various ways that fall under two 
general typologies: hierarchical studies and longitudinal ones. In a hierarchical study, the 
public agenda is viewed as a hierarchy of all of the important issues at a certain point in 
time; longitudinal studies on the other hand follow trends in the rise and fall of a small 
number of issues over time (Dearing & Rogers, 1996). In both cases, the public agenda 
remains a hierarchical set of issues; however, while longitudinal studies often track only 
one to three issues, the hierarchical approach looks at every issue on the agenda at that 
point in time. Therefore the public agenda in a hierarchical study is larger than one in a 
longitudinal study; generally a hierarchical public agenda will contain between five and 
10 issues.  
 On the other hand, the longitudinal approach only looks at one or two particularly 
volatile issues, resulting in a much smaller concept of an agenda. Because the 
longitudinal approach also omits less volatile or important issues from the agenda, a 
longitudinal public agenda is not a zero-sum agenda since a rise in one issue could be 
compensated for with a fall in an issue that is not being studied.  
 Because in most agenda setting studies the public agenda is viewed as a 
dependent variable in the context of an election, the public is often conceptualized as the 
voting public and frequently voters who are not committed to a candidate (McCombs & 
Shaw, 1972; Tedesco, McKinney, & Kaid, 2007).  
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 Therefore, for the purposes of this study the public agenda is defined as the zero-
sum hierarchical set of between five and 10 issues that uncommitted voters consider to be 
important within the context of the election.  
2.1.1.3 Candidate Agenda 
 The candidate agenda has also been conceptualized in many different ways based 
on whether the candidate agenda is viewed as an independent or dependent variable and 
which agenda(s) it is being compared to. When the candidate agenda is viewed as an 
independent variable influencing the media agenda, the candidate agenda is frequently 
defined in terms of the issues that candidates give attention to in their press releases 
(Dunn, 2009). When the candidate agenda is viewed as an independent variable affecting 
the public agenda, it is often defined in terms of the issues that candidates give attention 
to in their speeches and advertisements (Tedesco, et. al., 2007). When the candidate 
agenda is viewed as a dependent variable in any situation, all candidate produced 
messages including advertising, speeches, and press releases can be considered parts of 
the candidate agenda (Ridout & Mellen, 2007; Sigelman & Buell, 2004).  
 Therefore, since this study will look at the relationship of the candidate agenda 
with the media agenda and public agenda as an independent variable on voter choice, the 
candidate agenda is defined for this study as the zero-sum hierarchical set of between five 
and 10 issues that the candidate focuses on in candidate-created television advertising and 
websites. 
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2.1.2. Issues. 
 In order to fully understand what an agenda truly is, one must have a concept of 
what an issue is. Since in this study agendas is defined in terms of the hierarchical set of 
issues, it is important to define the constraints of issues and how they qualify to be on the 
agenda. According to Cobb and Elder (1983), an issue is “a conflict between two or more 
identifiable groups over procedural or substantive matters relating to the distributions of 
positions or resources” (as cited in Dearing & Rogers, 1996). This means that in order to 
be considered an issue an item must have at least two different positions that can be taken 
with regards to it. Therefore, absolute facts cannot be issues; for instance a candidate who 
focuses all of their attention on recounting the historical facts of a region does not address 
any issues because those facts cannot be reasonably disputed or disagreed with. However, 
as Dearing and Rogers (1996) point out, an issue can exist even if no one takes the other 
side. While issues such as drug abuse are not favored by anyone, the issue stems from the 
debate over how many resources should be allocated to and what approaches should be 
taken towards solving the problem. 
 Dearing and Rogers defined an issue as “a social problem, often conflictual, that 
has received mass media coverage” (1996, p. 3). This definition is unfortunately 
inadequate because not all issues categorized in research are necessarily social problems, 
as Patterson (1994) points out:“journalists…focus on the „horse race‟ or „game‟ aspects 
of a campaign since these are now central matters to predicting the outcome of the 
election” (as cited in Hayes, 2009, p. 3). 
 These “campaign” issues are further illustrated in Roberts‟ study, which found 
that negative advertising was an issue (1992). Another type of issue that frequently 
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appears on issue lists are the candidates‟ personal backgrounds, experience, and criminal 
history
1
 (Roberts, 1992; Sigelman& Buell, 2004; Ridout & Mellen, 2007).  
 Recognizing these three distinct definitions of an issue, Sigelman and Buell 
suggested the existence of three types of issues, each equally important to the campaign 
cycle. The three are categorized as campaign issues, candidate issues, and policy issues. 
Campaign issues are items including “charges, counter-charges, defenses concerning 
campaign tactics,” candidate issues are related to items such as the candidates‟ “physical 
health or their leadership traits,” and policy issues are the more traditional view of an 
issue including crime, economic policy, and others (Sigelman& Buell, 2004, p.654).  
 The next question to consider is how an issue becomes a part of an agenda; as 
previously mentioned, McCombs and Zhu (1995) found that agendas are typically limited 
to between five and 10 issues. However, one might wonder if the agenda has a maximum 
constraint of ten issues, how does research accommodate the fact that media often cover 
more than ten issues during a newscast? In their study, McCombs and Zhu used a 
salience threshold of 10% of total coverage as the cutoff point for whether an issue is on 
the agenda or not; this was based on previous research that found that “5-15 percent is the 
threshold for an issue to capture” attention (1995, p. 503). However, when they 
conducted a sensitivity analysis of their findings, they found that decreasing the threshold 
to 5% did not affect the results of their study.  
 In the context of this study, the salience of an issue may vary greatly across the 
various agendas being measured. Given that removing an issue from one agenda for 
failing to meet the 5% threshold when it may meet that threshold on another agenda, or 
with a specific subset of voters, may bias the results when comparing the agendas, a 
1.  Criminal history may include traffic tickets, arrests from the candidates‟ youth related to drugs and/or alcohol, and criminal ethics violations 
for incumbents 
14 
 
salience threshold may prove problematic. In order to effectively compare two agendas, 
issues must be considered regardless of salience threshold; since McCombs and Zhu 
found that decreasing the salience threshold does not affect the results of a study, the 
omission of a salience threshold should not bias the results of this study.  
 Therefore, for the purposes of this study, an issue is defined as any two-sided 
topic of concern relating to the campaign, candidate, or policy that occurs in the entity to 
which the subsequent agenda is ascribed.  
2.1.3 Salience 
 Salience is a key element of agenda setting; it is “the degree to which an issue on 
the agenda is perceived as relatively important” (Dearing & Rogers, 1996, p. 8). The vast 
majority of agenda setting research focuses on the concept of salience transfer in which 
the relative importance of an issue on one agenda influences the relative importance of 
that issue on another agenda. 
 Since the salience of the various issues alter the form and structure of an agenda, 
one must have a basic understanding how salience is determined in order to fully 
understand the concept of an agenda. Media salience, according to Kiousis (2004), is 
defined by three dimensions: attention, prominence, and valence (as cited in McCombs, 
2005). Attention is defined by the number of stories on the issue, prominence is how 
much time and space is taken up by the story, while valence is considered the tone of the 
story (McCombs, 2005). Public salience is a much more complicated matter, which is 
usually conceptualized as either a perception based a personal frame of reference (i.e. 
what issues are important to you?) or a social frame of reference (i.e. what issues are 
most important to your country or community). The determination of the reference frame 
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used varies based on the nature of the study that the measure will be used for (McCombs, 
2005). Unfortunately, there hasn‟t been any theoretical exploration of how to determine 
candidate salience; however, since the candidate agenda is generally drawn from 
candidate-produced media, it would make sense to use dimensions similar to those used 
in media salience.  
 Since the idea of valence is generally geared towards the positive or negative tone 
of a message, it is generally more relevant to studies in framing than in basic agenda 
setting; likewise since the use of a social frame of reference is less indicative of their 
personal beliefs it will be less likely to create an actual public agenda and is more likely 
to create a perceived public agenda, which isn‟t helpful in the context of this study. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this study, salience is defined as the degree to which an 
issue is represented in messages or perceptions as important and prominent in the context 
of the entity to which the subsequent agenda will be ascribed. 
2.2 Discounting Theory 
 Discounting theory is a theory of voter behavior taken from the political science 
discipline. In general, discounting theory states that voters know that candidates cannot 
fully deliver on their campaign promises and so they „discount‟ campaign pledges and 
instead select the candidate that they believe will cause the government to address the 
policies the voter desires (Tomz & Van Houweling, 2008). Because of this approach, 
Tomz and Van Houweling state that under discounting theory “voters may favor 
candidates unlike themselves, if such candidates stand the best chance of producing the 
most desirable policy outcomes” (2008, p. 303).  
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Discounting theory is among a group of models of voter choice that have been 
found to be employed under certain conditions (Tomz& Van Houweling, 2008). The 
research shows that uncommitted voters are most likely to employ discounting theory 
when selecting a candidate and that it is least commonly employed by strong partisan 
voters (Tomz& Van Houweling, 2008). 
 Noted political scientist Samuel Popkin has observed that there are three factors 
that must be present for an issue to be effective and relevant to a campaign. Popkin states 
that voters must see the connections between: the issue and the office, the issue and the 
candidate, and the issue and results they care about (1991, p. 100). In discounting theory 
voter choice is driven by an impulse to elect the candidate who will produce the best 
policy outcomes, and Popkin‟s three criteria provide the metric by which this potential 
outcome can be judged. In order for a voter to believe that a candidate will produce a 
desirable policy that voter must see that, if elected, the candidate would have the power 
to act on the issue, that the candidate would act on the issue, and that such action would 
produce a result that the voter cares about.  
 Most research involving discounting theory has focused on policy issues (e.g. 
Grofman, 1985; Kedar, 2005); however, the theory can be applied to candidate and 
campaign issues as well. In terms of candidate issues, the voter uses the candidate‟s focus 
on issues such as experience and personal background to affect his perception of how 
well the candidate will be able to perform his or her duties if elected. For instance, if a 
candidate focuses on his previous experience working across party lines, the voter will 
use that information to presume that, if elected, the candidate will work across party lines 
and be more effective in producing desirable policy outcomes. This connection between 
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candidate issues and anticipated performance of the duties of the office satisfies the first 
condition of Popkin‟s model of effective issues. Since these candidate issues are 
inherently a part of the candidate, the second condition of Popkin‟s model is also easily 
met. The third condition of Popkin‟s model is trickier to establish, since voters may not 
necessarily care about the benefits or pitfalls of certain character traits in the candidate; 
however, since discounting theory applies to voter choice relevant to desirable outcomes, 
those candidate issues that are tied to such outcomes would play a role in determining 
voter choice under discounting theory.  
 In terms of campaign issues, the voter looks toward the campaign style of each 
candidate as a predictor of the candidate‟s governing style. The tone of a campaign has 
been shown to affect voter perceptions of the candidates (Pinkleton, 1997). If voters are 
concerned with the prevalence of negative advertising, they will view candidates that use 
negative advertising as less likely to produce desirable outcomes. Here again the 
connections between the candidate and the issue are clear; also the same conditions that 
apply to candidate issues regarding desirable outcomes apply to campaign issues. The 
connection between campaign issues and the office can be quite difficult; there are two 
schools of thought on the topic of governing versus campaigning. Some political 
scientists argue that while the two are not mutually exclusive, their aims are so different 
that it is difficult to approach them with the same strategy (Tenpas & Dickinson, 1997). 
Others argue that modern elected officials will govern by campaigning; melding the two 
activities into a single approach (Edwards III, 2006). For those who ascribe to the latter 
opinion, campaign issues can easily be tied to the office; however, for those who hold 
that campaigns and governance are separate, the connection must be made in a more 
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roundabout manner. As Pinkleton (1997) identified, the tone of a campaign does affect 
voter perceptions of candidates; therefore, these campaign issues become indicators of 
latent candidate issues. In either case, the final condition of Popkin‟s model is met.  
 In order to bridge the conceptual gap between discounting theory and agenda 
setting, one must consider that independent voters are less likely to pay very close 
attention to any particular candidate. In doing so, they may limit their access to 
information about the candidate to media reports, television advertisements and literature 
that they receive either in the mail or from canvassers. This information, especially the 
former two, rarely contains specific policy proposals and instead contains messages that 
touch on issues and attempt to frame the problem. The media‟s role in communicating 
issue salience in this way is critical as it forces individuals without strong partisan beliefs 
to use discounting theory due to a lack of specific policy proposals to consider. The basic 
mechanics of agenda setting will only communicate issue salience, not issue valence or 
more complex information; therefore, agenda setting works to enable and reinforce the 
use of discounting by independent voters.  
2.2.1 The Uncommitted Voter 
 A recurring concept through both discounting and agenda setting research is the 
idea of the uncommitted voter. McCombs and Shaw (1972) defined uncommitted voters 
bluntly as “those who had not yet definitely decided how to vote” (p. 178). In discounting 
theory, uncommitted voters are identified as registered independents and those with non-
committal opinions on the issues (Tomz& Van Houweling, 2008). 
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 For the purposes of this study, uncommitted voters are defined as individuals who 
are likely to vote and are not associated with either political party. This addresses the two 
key components of an uncommitted voter: party neutrality and their propensity to vote.  
2.2.2 Campaign Promises 
 Campaign promises are rarely defined conceptually, more frequently researchers 
choose to view campaign promises in terms of the promises themselves. Campaign 
promises can be viewed within the context of issues, since promises address issues 
(Shaw, 1998). A campaign promise is operationally defined as a statement by a candidate 
regarding what he or she would do about an issue if elected (Tomz& Van Houweling, 
2008). In order to conceptualize a campaign promise, one must look at the elements of a 
campaign promise. A campaign promise must advocate for a single policy position on an 
issue and it must be stated by the candidate in such a way that it shows the candidate 
intends on pursuing that policy. For instance, while taxes may be an issue the 
corresponding campaign promise would be to cut taxes by 5%. Therefore, a campaign 
promise is defined as a campaign statement that advocates for a specific action on an 
issue.  
 According to discounting theory, voters will discount campaign promises and will 
instead pay attention to the issues; therefore, the issues themselves become the predictors 
of the voter choice rather than the policy positions (Tomz& Van Houweling, 2008).   
2.3 Convergence 
 Since the beginning of agenda setting research, the key to drawing any 
meaningful conclusions has been showing the similarities or differences between two 
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agendas. There are two ways to conceptualize the convergence of agendas that 
correspond to the two approaches to studying agendas. In a hierarchical approach, the 
convergence of agendas is conceptualized as a snapshot comparison, simply the 
hierarchical similarities between two agendas at any given time. In a longitudinal 
approach, convergence is more complex. Since longitudinal studies measure changes in 
the agendas over time, they must also account for the changes in similarities between the 
agendas over time. Since longitudinal studies also look at issues on an individual basis; 
the convergence must be addressed on an issue by issue basis. Therefore, in a 
longitudinal study, convergence is defined as the change in the difference between the 
salience of a single issue on two agendas over time.  
 This study will utilize a modified hierarchical approach, utilizing a percentage 
based convergence score developed by Sigelman and Buell (2004). The convergence 
score is a measure that shows a true measure of the similarity between agendas. Their 
equation compares the sum of the absolute difference between the percentages of 
attention given to each issue, divided by 2 to account for the inclusion of two agendas in 
the equation; this provides a divergence score, which then is subtracted from 100 to 
produce a convergence score (Sigelman& Buell, 2004). On this scale, a score of 100 
would indicate that two agendas are perfectly identical while a score of 0 would indicate 
that two agendas are completely dissimilar. A convergence score of 75 would mean that 
the two agendas are 75% identical and 25% of one agenda would have to be redistributed 
in order to create a perfect match. A detailed explanation of this score is located in the 
methods section (see section 4.3.4).  
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
3.1 The Media and Public Agenda 
 Agenda setting theory states that there will be a convergence between the media 
and public agenda and the research suggests that there is a positive correlation between 
the media and public agenda of between r = +.53 and r = +.76 (Wanta & Ghanem, 2006; 
Chen &Lasorsa, 2008). Since correlations are measurements of covariance and 
covariance is related to similarity, I hypothesize that: 
H1: The convergence score between the media and public agenda will be greater 
than 50. 
3.2 Candidate and Media Agenda 
 The research suggests that candidate and media agendas have a reciprocal 
relationship in which the media set the candidate agenda as well as the candidate setting 
the media agenda (Dunn, 2009). Since this reciprocal relationship is generally stronger 
than the one-way media-public correlation, I hypothesize that: 
H2: The convergence score between each of the candidate agendas and the media 
agenda will be greater than the media-public convergence score. 
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3.3 Candidate and Public Agenda 
 Because the research and theory suggest that there will be significant convergence 
between the candidate and media agendas and between the media and public agenda, 
there should logically be a relationship between the candidate and public agendas. 
However, the strength of the impact that candidate-media convergence has on candidate-
public convergence has not been tested. This leads me to the following research question: 
RQ1: What is the relationship between the candidate-media convergence and the 
candidate-public convergence? 
3.4 Candidate-Public Convergence and Voter Choice 
 According to discounting theory, voters will choose the candidate who they 
believe will have the best chance of bringing attention to the issues that they are 
concerned about (Tomz& Van Houweling, 2008). Since the convergence between the 
candidate and public agendas is a measure of how similar a candidate‟s issue salience is 
to the public‟s issue salience, there should be a relationship between the convergence and 
voter choice. As a result of this, I hypothesize: 
H3: There will be a significant positive correlation between the candidate-public 
convergence score and the percentage of the vote won by that candidate. 
3.5 Candidate-Media Convergence and Voter Choice 
 Given the logical premise of RQ1 that there will be a correlation between 
candidate-media convergence and candidate-public convergence and the theoretical basis 
behind H3 that there will be a correlation between candidate-public convergence and 
voter choice, the following research question is posed: 
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RQ2: Is there a relationship between candidate-media convergence and 
percentage of the vote won by that candidate?  
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODS 
4.1 Procedure 
 The present study examined these research questions and hypotheses in the 
context of the 2010 general election in Cuyahoga County. Specifically this study looked 
at the following races: Ohio Governor, United States Senate, Ohio Secretary of State, 
Ohio Attorney General, Ohio State Treasurer, Ohio State Auditor, and Cuyahoga County 
Executive. These races were chosen to reflect a diverse array of races that shared a 
common electorate with common media outlets across several political levels. The 
analysis of other elections such as State House of Representatives, State Senate, U.S. 
House of Representatives and County Council were not considered for analysis because 
of difficulties in ensuring a representative sample across smaller districts and the need for 
additional analysis of community level media outlets that are more difficult to identify 
and collect. A preliminary analysis was performed in August 2010 of candidate websites 
and the Cleveland Plain Dealer online edition. From this preliminary analysis, a list of 
every issue mentioned was developed for use in the subsequent content analysis and 
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survey. This list of issues represented between 8 and 10potential issues that could appear 
on any of the three agendas (media, public and candidate) in each of the races. 
 In order to measure the public agenda and voter choice, a mail survey was 
distributed one week before Election Day, on October 25, 2010, with instructions to be 
completed prior to Election Day so that the questionnaires would be filled out before the 
respondents knew who won the elections. Unfortunately, due to delays at the post office, 
many respondents did not receive their surveys until after Election Day. Therefore, the 
majority of respondents are presumed to have completed the survey after the election.  
4.2 Participants 
 A mail questionnaire (see Appendix A) was distributed to 2970 randomly selected 
independents that had neither have neither declared a party affiliation nor voted in a 
partisan primary within the last five years and were likely voters in a mid-term election as 
determined by the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections. The questionnaires were mailed 
only to respondents in cities with a 2010 census response rate of 75% or higher in order 
to maximize the response for this survey. The questionnaire was also made available 
online via Survey Monkey with a URL for the questionnaire identified in the mailing.  
4.3 Measurement of Variables 
 4.3.1 Media Agenda 
 The media agenda was measured through a thorough content analysis of a census 
of political newspaper articles in the Cleveland Plain Dealer and transcripts of evening 
and late night local television newscasts (Channels 3, 5, 8 and 19) between October 1
st
 
and November 2
nd
 2010 in Cuyahoga County. Issue mentions were coded using the 
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computer-aided text analysis program Yoshikoder. Dictionaries (see Appendix F) were 
developed to represent keywords indicating issue mentions and the frequency of these 
keywords was used to represent the salience of the issues on the media agenda. This 
measurement is consistent with the conceptualization of the media agenda in this study 
and with the traditional approach to content analysis of agendas (McCombs, 2005). 
 Separate media agendas were calculated for all news, all television news, 
newspapers and each of the individual local television news stations. Newspaper articles 
were acquired via a Lexis-Nexis search for Cleveland Plain Dealer articles between 
October 1
st
 and November 2
nd
 within the subject category “Government and Public 
Administration.” Television news stories and their closed-captioned transcripts were 
captured using SnapStream Enterprise TV search software.  
 Once the total number of mentions is determined for each issue, the percentage of 
issue mentions will be calculated. For instance, if issues A, B, C, and D receive 50, 30, 
18, and 2 mentions respectively (n=100) their percentages will be determined as 50%, 
30%, 18%, and 2%, respectively.  
 4.3.2 Candidate Agenda 
 The candidate agenda was measured through a thorough content analysis of all of 
candidate generated television advertising during the last month of the election and 
websites for each major candidate that voters were likely to be exposed to. Active copies 
of candidate websites were downloaded on November 1, 2010 using HTTrack website 
copier. This enabled through and accurate content analysis of the campaign messages on 
candidate websites even after the election. Television advertisements were captured using 
SnapStream Enterprise TV software, the majority of these ads were not closed captioned 
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and were transcribed by the author and one volunteer. An agenda was developed for each 
candidate using the same methodology used in measuring the media agenda. Given the 
anticipated volume of advertisements issued on behalf of a candidate by political action 
committees and other non-candidate sources, these messages were collected and included 
in a secondary analysis; however, due to a lower than expected volume of these ads in the 
races being studied during the timeframe examined, these ads did not provide an adequate 
sample for a full analysis.  
 It is also important to note that in the case of the treasurer race there were a few 
problems in coding the agenda which may have impacted the results. One candidate, Josh 
Mandel, made frequent reference to his military service in television ads and on his 
website. The initial coding of these mentions placed military references under the 
category “veteran‟s affairs.” Upon further review of the agenda, it became apparent that 
these references were more likely taken as proxies for “experience” and “responsibility.” 
However, since the survey had already been distributed with the “veteran‟s affairs” issue 
included, it was determined not to attempt to recode this issue as it may bias the data. 
 4.3.3 Public Agenda 
 The measurement of the public agenda poses certain methodological problems, 
since public agenda is traditionally measured through the use of an MIP, or most 
important problem, question, which is then indexed ordinally based on the frequency of 
responses (Dearing & Rogers, 1996).  
 Although the MIP is the most commonly used measure of the public agenda for 
normal agenda setting research, it is inadequate as a predictor of voter choice. The 
question of “What is the most important problem facing the nation/state/county/city 
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today?” cannot be used as the basis for predicting voter choice because such a use would 
assume that individual voters consider only one issue when they go to the polls. 
However, none of the predominant theories from political science suggests that voters use 
a single issue, in and of itself, as the basis of their candidate choice (Tomz& Van 
Houweling, 2008). The research suggests that voters make judgments about candidates 
based on a set of issues that the voter considers important. This set of issues is the 
individual level analog to the aggregate public agenda. Therefore, one way to measure 
the aggregate public agenda in relation to voter choice is to identify the set of issues that 
influence the vote at the individual level and then aggregate the data to form an overall 
public agenda.  
 The major problem with an ordinal measurement of an agenda is that it results in 
an over-representation of the differences between items that have similar salience and an 
under-representation of the differences between items that have dissimilar salience. For 
example, given three issues: A, B, and C with 800, 725, and 300 respective mentions in 
the media agenda and with 700, 100, and 50 instances as the MIP in the public agenda, 
the resulting analysis would show that the two agendas converge perfectly since they 
both share the rank-order A,B,C. However, the numbers clearly show that the media 
discuss issue B far more than the public is concerned with it.  
 One way to accurately show these differences is to use a percentage of the 
mentions. For the example above, the media agenda (n=1,825) would have a percentage 
of mentions of A=43.8%, B=39.7%, and C=16.4% while for the public agenda the 
percentage of instances as the MIP (n=850) would be A=82.4%, B=11.8%, and C=5.9%. 
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When the agenda is formed hierarchically based on percentage the differences between 
the two agendas becomes clear, even though the rank-order is the same.  
 Therefore, in order to measure the public agenda accurately and in a manner that 
can be used as a predictor of voter choice, the following method for collecting and 
aggregating the data was developed. A survey was distributed that contained a list of the 
8 to 10 potential issues for each race that were identified in the preliminary content 
analysis. Respondents were asked to “In the race for _________, place a check mark next 
to every issue that you considered VERY IMPORTANT in deciding who to vote for.” 
This question appeared7 times, once for each race that the respondent had the opportunity 
to vote in. Placing the words “very important” in all capital letters was intended to 
discourage the respondent from marking issues that they considered but that did not play 
a role in their deciding which candidate to vote for.  
 In order to calculate the aggregate public agenda, the total number of check marks 
for each issue was totaled and divided over the total number of check marks across all 
issues in that race to determine a percentage. For example, if there are three potential 
issues: A, B, and C and issue A receives 275 check marks, issue B receives 200, and 
issue C receives 90; the aggregate agenda will be calculated for n=565 that A=48.6%, 
B=35.4% and C=15.9%. 
 4.3.4 Convergence 
 Traditionally, convergence is determined by the use of a Pearson‟s r correlation 
between the rank-order emphases of issues on two agendas. This method, though 
common, is not necessarily the most accurate in showing convergence. While a 
correlation does show to what extent two variables co-vary, it does not give a true 
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representation of how similar they are. For example if the public agenda for issues A, B, 
C, and D is: 48%, 22%, 16%, and 14% respectively and the media agenda for those same 
issues is: 53%, 17%, 19%, and 11% respectively, r = +.9799 while this indicates a strong 
correlation, it cannot be said that the agendas are 97.99% similar or even the r
2
of 96% 
similar; in fact, this is not the case.  
 Knowing this and desiring a measure that provides a true measure of the 
similarity between agendas, rather than just the co-variance, Sigelman and Buell (2004) 
developed a convergence score that produces just that. Their equation compares the sum 
of the absolute difference between the percentages of attention given to each issue, 
divided by 2 to account for the inclusion of two agendas in the equation; this provides a 
divergence score, which then is subtracted from 100 to produce a convergence score 
(Sigelman& Buell, 2004). This equation, though relatively new, has been used to 
compare agendas between candidates (Sigelman& Buell, 2004), and between candidates 
and the media (Hayes, 2009; Ridout & Mellen, 2007).  
 The convergence score is appealing in two ways, as Hayes explains; first it allows 
researchers to “quantify the similarity among agendas and to compare those figures 
[across time]. Second, [it] is intuitively appealing, showing the amount of overlap 
between…agendas and how much of an agenda would have to be changed to achieve 
total convergence” (2009, p. 9). For the purposes of this study, this convergence score is 
appealing in that it allows for a direct comparison between the strength of the similarities 
between agendas and other variables, specifically voter choice.  
 To understand how the convergence score works, Sigelman and Buell provide an 
explanation that supposes that the researcher knows exactly how much attention is paid 
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by each candidate on every issue. By expressing these data in terms of a percentage, the 
researcher could chart a profile of the candidates and their issues by placing issues on the 
x-axis and the percentage of attention on the y-axis. Comparing these two profiles would 
give an idea of how much the two converged. In order to mathematically determine how 
much the two sides converge, one can sum the absolute differences between the levels of 
attention paid to each issue by each candidate.  
Suppose that there are two sources and only three issues of concern, with the 
sources giving those issues attention in the following manner: 
 Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 3 
Source A 100% 0% 0% 
Source B 0% 100% 0% 
 
 In this case, both sources focus exclusively on different issues and completely 
ignore the third issue, resulting in zero convergence. Summing the absolute differences of 
the issue profiles would produce this equation |100-0|+|0-100|+|0-0| = 200. The difference 
is 200 because the calculation considers both how much of A would need to be 
redistributed to match B and how much of B would need to be redistributed to match A. 
If source A remained the same and source B shifted its attention to issue 1, the absolute 
differences would add to zero, meaning perfect convergence.  
Since a sum of 0 indicates perfect convergence while a score of 200 indicates 
perfect divergence and this study aims to compare convergence scores to percentages, the 
equation must be calibrated to fall between zero and 100. Since there are two agendas, 
this is done by dividing the sum of absolute differences by two. Since in this case a 
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higher score indicates a case of more divergence and the intent is to create a scale of 
convergence, the recalibrated sum of absolute differences must be subtracted from 100 to 
produce a scale where a score of 0 indicates no convergence and a score of 100 indicates 
perfect convergence. The final equation is given as:  
C = 100 - (∑n i=1 |PAi - PBi|) / 2 
where PAi is the percentage of attention given to issue i on agenda A and PBi is the 
percentage of attention given to issue i on agenda B.  
Suppose that for two sources and three issues the attention profile instead looked like 
this:  
 Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 3 
Source A 60% 40% 0% 
Source B 0% 40% 60% 
 
 In this case the sum of the absolute differences would be: |60-0|+|40-40|+|0-60| = 
120. The recalibrated sum would be 120/2 = 60, which would be subtracted from 100 to 
produce the convergence score of 40. This indicates that 40% of the sources‟ issue 
profiles overlap and that 60% of the total attention would need to be reallocated in order 
to produce a perfect match. 
 In this study, there will be three convergence scores calculated. For the media-
public agenda convergence score the following equation will be used: 
Cmp = 100 - (∑
n
 i=1 |Pmi - Ppi|) / 2 
where Cmp is the media-public convergence score, Pmi is the percentage of the media 
agenda given to issue i, and Ppi is the percentage of the public agenda given to issue i.  
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 The media-candidate agenda convergence score will be determined by:  
Cmc = 100 - (∑
n
 i=1 |Pmi - Pci|) / 2 
where Cmc is the media-candidate convergence score, Pmi is the percentage of the media 
agenda given to issue i, and Pci is the percentage of the candidate agenda given to issue i.  
 The candidate-public agenda convergence score will be determined by:  
Ccp = 100 - (∑
n
 i=1 |Pci - Ppi|) / 2 
where Ccp is the candidate-public convergence score, Pci is the percentage of the 
candidate agenda given to issue i, and Ppi is the percentage of the public agenda given to 
issue i. It is important to note that since the absolute value of the difference between the 
agendas is taken, the order of the agenda terms does not matter. Therefore, the 
convergence score shares a weakness with Pearson‟s r in that it does not show ordering, a 
key component in attempting to establish causality.  
4.3.5 Voter choice 
 Voter choice was measured based on survey respondents‟ self-reports of who they 
voted for divided by the total number of reported votes in the race. Therefore, voter 
choice is expressed in terms of the percentage of the vote received. Any votes cast for a 
candidate who was not included in the analysis will be treated as missing data. It is 
important to note that since the survey was distributed only to independent voters, the 
percentages of votes reported in the survey are not representative of the election results. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
5.1.1 Participants 
There were 241 completed questionnaires returned (n=227) or submitted online 
(n=14), of that number 226 reported voting in the election and were therefore included in 
the analysis. Therefore the net response rate was 7.6%. Of these 226 responses, there 
were 119 respondents that self-reported their political views as moderate or self-reporting 
a tendency to vote for equal numbers of Democrats and Republicans. In light of this, each 
of the hypotheses was tested using public agendas calculated for both the entire 
respondent pool and the independent only pool. Additionally, out of the 226 responses, 
only 18 respondents reported using candidate websites to get information. Therefore each 
of the hypotheses was tested using candidate agendas calculated for both television 
advertisements and website content combined and television advertisements alone, 
however website only agendas were not included in the analysis.   
Demographically, the 241 respondents ranged in age from 22 to 94 (n=241, 
M=53.74, SD = 14.1); they were 51% female (n=123) and 49% male (n=118). The 
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respondents were 95% white (n=227), 2.1% Asian or Pacific Islander (n=5) and less than 
1% African-American and Hispanic (n=2). This lack of racial diversity is likely due to 
using lack of political affiliation and likelihood of voting as a selection criteria as most 
African-Americans and Hispanics that are likely to vote in Cuyahoga County are 
affiliated with a political party.  
5.1.2 Media Agendas 
 The television agenda included closed captioned transcripts from 228 evening and 
late night local television news programs. Of those 228, 61 were captured from Channel 
3, 59 from Channel 5, 50 from Channel 8 and 58 from channel 19.The newspaper agenda 
included 590 articles from the Plain Dealer that were collected in a Lexis-Nexis search.  
 With regard to the Attorney General race, the Channel 3 agenda included 1356 
issue mentions, the Channel 5 agenda included 1197 issue mentions, the Channel 8 
agenda included 1734 issue mentions, the Channel 19 agenda included 1199 issue 
mentions, and the newspaper agenda included 5070 issue mentions. The total media 
agenda for this race included 10556 issue mentions. 
With regard to the Auditor race, the Channel 3 agenda included 770 issue 
mentions, the Channel 5 agenda included 749 issue mentions, the Channel 8 agenda 
included 925 issue mentions, the Channel 19 agenda included 775 issue mentions, and 
the newspaper agenda included 4397 issue mentions. The total media agenda for this race 
included 7616 issue mentions.   
 With regard to the County Executive race, the Channel 3 agenda included 1636 
issue mentions, the Channel 5 agenda included 1613 issue mentions, the Channel 8 
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agenda included 2218 issue mentions, the Channel 19 agenda included 1585 issue 
mentions, and the newspaper agenda included 5799 issue mentions. The total media 
agenda for this race included 12851 issue mentions.   
With regard to the gubernatorial race, the Channel 3 agenda included 1573 issue 
mentions, the Channel 5 agenda included 1386 issue mentions, the Channel 8 agenda 
included 1998 issue mentions, the Channel 19 agenda included 1164 issue mentions, and 
the newspaper agenda included 5529 issue mentions. The total media agenda for this race 
included 11650 issue mentions. 
With regard to the Senate race, the Channel 3 agenda included 1517 issue 
mentions, the Channel 5 agenda included 1298 issue mentions, the Channel 8 agenda 
included 1900 issue mentions, the Channel 19 agenda included 1100 issue mentions, and 
the newspaper agenda included 4883 issue mentions. The total media agenda for this race 
included 10698 issue mentions. 
With regard to the Secretary of State race, the Channel 3 agenda included 729 
issue mentions, the Channel 5 agenda included 706 issue mentions, the Channel 8 agenda 
included 821 issue mentions, the Channel 19 agenda included 657 issue mentions, and 
the newspaper agenda included 3812 issue mentions. The total media agenda for this race 
included 6725 issue mentions. 
With regard to the Treasurer race, the Channel 3 agenda included 482 issue 
mentions, the Channel 5 agenda included 463 issue mentions, the Channel 8 agenda 
included 657 issue mentions, the Channel 19 agenda included 478 issue mentions, and 
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the newspaper agenda included 2698 issue mentions. The total media agenda for this race 
included 4778 issue mentions. 
5.1.3 Candidate Agendas 
 Candidate agendas were determined by analyzing the candidates‟ television 
advertisements from the last month of the election and website content on Election Day. 
In the Attorney General race, Richard Cordray had nine television advertisements with 13 
issue mentions and Mike Dewine had five television advertisements with 13 issue 
mentions. In the Auditor race, David Pepper had two television advertisements with 9 
issue mentions and Dave Yost had four television advertisements with 19 issue mentions. 
In the County Executive race, Matt Dolan had four television advertisements with 13 
issue mentions, Ed Fitzgerald had one television advertisement with six issue mentions 
and Ken Lanci had four television advertisements with 18 issue mentions.  
 In the gubernatorial race, John Kasich had seven television advertisements with 
41 issue mentions and Ted Strickland had seven television advertisements with 50 issue 
mentions. In the Senate race, Lee Fisher had two advertisements in the last month of the 
election with 17 issue mentions and Rob Portman had eight television advertisements 
with 46 issue mentions. In the Secretary of State race, Jon Husted had two television 
advertisements with seven issue mentions and Maryellen O‟Shaughnessey had three 
television advertisements with seven issue mentions. In the Treasurer race, Kevin Boyce 
had four television advertisements with 17 issue mentions and Josh Mandel had three 
television advertisements with 21 issue mentions.  
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Candidate websites were recorded on Election Day for the purposes of this 
analysis. In the Attorney General race, Richard Cordray‟s website had 55 issue mentions 
and Mike Dewine had 54 issue mentions. In the Auditor race, David Pepper‟s website 
had 217 issue mentions and Dave Yost‟s website had 20 issue mentions. In the County 
Executive race, Matt Dolan‟s website had 84 issue mentions, Ed Fitzgerald had 535 issue 
mentions, Ken Lanci‟s website had 369 issue mentions, David Ellison‟s website had 122 
issue mentions, Tim McCormack‟s website had 62 issue mentions and Don Scipione‟s 
website had 273 issue mentions.  
In the gubernatorial race, John Kasich‟s website had 274 issue mentions and Ted 
Strickland‟s had 475 issue mentions. In the Senate race, Lee Fisher‟s website had 472 
issue mentions and Rob Portman‟s website had 738 issue mentions. In the Secretary of 
State race, Jon Husted‟s website had 82 issue mentions and Maryellen O‟Shaughnessey‟s 
website had 88 issue mentions. Lastly in the Treasurer‟s race, Kevin Boyce‟s website had 
24 issue mentions and Josh Mandel‟s website had 54 issue mentions.  
The full scored agendas for the television only and the combined television and 
website candidate agendas can be found in Appendix C.  
5.2 Hypothesis and Research Question Testing 
 5.2.1 Hypothesis 1: The convergence score between the media and public agenda 
will be greater than 50. 
 This hypothesis sought to test the simple descriptive measure of agenda 
convergence within the context of agenda setting theory. The results shown in Tables 1 
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and 2 indicate that the media public convergence score is above 50 in 85.7% of cases in 
both the total public agenda and the independent-only public agenda.  
Table 1. Media convergence with the total public agenda 
 
All 
News 
TV 
News 
Newspaper Ch. 3 Ch. 5 Ch. 8 Ch. 
19 
Governor 75 66 81 68 69 61 67 
SOS 72 72 69 73 70 70 71 
AG 63 58 68 53 54 56 68 
Treasurer 54 49*** 53 45*** 41*** 52 55 
Auditor 67 62 71 65 58 62 61 
Senate 68 63 72 64 63 59 64 
County 
Executive 
58 49*** 64 52 50*** 46*** 47*** 
***Convergence score at or below 50 
Table 2. Media convergence with the independent-only public agenda 
 
All 
News 
TV 
News 
Newspaper Ch. 3 Ch. 5 Ch. 8 Ch. 
19 
Governor 77 69 83 70 70 64 69 
SOS 72 74 69 74 72 72 72 
AG 64 59 69 55 56 57 69 
Treasurer 51 47*** 50*** 43*** 39*** 51 53 
Auditor 65 60 69 63 56 61 60 
Senate 69 64 74 65 64 59 64 
County 
Executive 57 50*** 63 53 51 47*** 48*** 
***Convergence score at or below 50 
 The convergence score was above 50 in all cases and the newspaper convergence 
score substantially above 50 in all cases except for in the context of the Treasurer election 
and the average media public convergence score was 62 when using the total public 
agenda and 61.5 when using the independent only public agenda. Therefore, hypothesis 1 
is supported.  
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 To help understand this data, consider the gubernatorial race; the convergence 
score with all news for the independent public of 77 means that with regard to that race 
the total media agenda was 77% similar to the total public agenda. 
The fact that the media-public convergence score was generally above 50 and that 
average convergence with both the total public and independent only public was near 62 
indicates that the media and public exhibit very similar issue agendas during an election. 
Since convergence scores alone cannot establish causation the data cannot suggest how 
this convergence is created, however agenda setting theory would suggest that the 
convergence is the result of the agenda setting function of the media.  
 It is important to note here that the low convergence in the case of the treasurer 
race may be partially attributed to the aforementioned coding problem regarding the 
“veterans‟ affairs” issue. Additionally, the research found that the public was concerned 
with “financial education,” which was an issue that was not highly represented in the 
media agenda.  
5.2.2 Hypothesis 2: The convergence score between each of the candidate 
agendas and the media agenda will be greater than the media-public convergence score. 
 In order to test for a significant difference between the candidate-media 
convergence scores and the media-public convergence score, the comparable agendas 
were and evaluated in a paired-samples t-test under four conditions: using the 
independent-only public and total public agenda and total and television only candidate 
agendas. The test found that in both cases using the television only candidate agenda, the 
candidate-media convergence score was significantly lower than the media-public agenda 
(see Table 3 for a summary, see Appendix E for full t-test results). However, in both 
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cases using the total candidate agenda the all media - candidate convergence score was 
significantly higher than the all media – public convergence score. Therefore, hypothesis 
2 is partially supported.  
 Table 3. Results of paired-samples t-test for differences between candidate-
media convergence and media-public convergence 
 
All 
News 
TV 
News 
Newspape
r 
Ch. 3 Ch. 5 Ch. 8 Ch. 19 
Independ
ents and 
total 
candidate 
agenda 
(n=18) 
Higher 
** 
N.S. N.S. N.S. Higher* N.S. N.S. 
Independ
ents and 
candidate 
TV 
agenda 
(n=15) 
Lower 
** 
Lower 
** 
Lower 
** 
Lower 
** 
Lower 
** 
Lower 
** 
Lower 
** 
All voters 
and total 
candidate 
agenda 
(n=18) 
Higher 
** 
Higher* N.S. N.S. Higher* Higher* Higher* 
All voters 
and 
candidate 
TV 
agenda 
(n=15) 
Lower 
** 
Lower 
** 
Lower 
** 
Lower 
** 
Lower 
** 
Lower 
** 
Lower 
** 
* p<.05 ** p <.01; n is the number of candidates with an agenda 
The fact that candidate-convergences are higher than media-public convergence is 
a natural reflection of the reciprocal nature of candidate-media agenda setting. It is 
interesting to note that the convergence between the candidates‟ television advertising 
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agendas and the media-agenda was much lower than the convergence between the media 
and public agendas. This is because the vehicle for the reciprocal relationship between 
candidates and the media are often press releases, stump speeches and policy papers that 
are more accurately reflected on candidate websites than in their television advertising.  
5.2.3 Research Question 1: What is the relationship between the candidate-media 
convergence and the candidate-public convergence? 
To answer this question the candidate-public convergence scores for each of the 
18 candidates were correlated with the candidate-media convergence measures for each 
media agenda. Since three candidates did not air television ads, the television only 
agendas were analyzed excluding those candidates.  
For both the independents only(r=.474, p<.05) and total public agendas(r=.473, 
p<.05), a significant positive correlation was found between candidate-newspaper media 
convergence and candidate-public convergence. In the cases using only the candidate 
television advertising agenda, there was no significant relationship between candidate-
media convergence and candidate-public convergence. There were also no significant 
correlations between candidate-public convergence and candidate-media convergence 
when considering any media agendas except the newspaper media agenda.  
The significant correlations indicate that the closer the candidates‟ total agendas 
were to the newspaper agenda, the closer the candidates‟ total agendas were to the public 
agenda. Therefore, candidates whose issue agendas had higher convergence with the 
newspaper also had a higher convergence with the public. It is interesting to note that the 
candidate television agenda had no significant correlations, meaning that the media 
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agenda does not appear to play a role in developing convergence between candidates‟ 
television advertising agendas and the public agenda.  
It is also interesting to note that the only significant relationships were found 
when looking at the newspaper agenda, while the television and total news agendas did 
not show a significant relationship. This may indicate that the agenda setting effect for 
television media is not as strong as it is for print media, therefore a candidate‟s 
convergence with the television media may not as strongly translate into convergence 
with the public. This is consistent with the literature that suggests that agenda setting is 
stronger in print media than in televised media (Ridout & Mellen, 2007; Roberts, 1992).  
5.2.4 Hypothesis 3: There will be a significant positive correlation between the 
candidate-public convergence score and the percentage of the vote won by that 
candidate. 
In order to test this hypothesis, again four variations of the agendas were used to 
reflect candidate total versus television only agenda and independent versus all voters for 
both their agenda and the percent of vote. As shown in Table 4, the analysis found a 
significant positive correlation between candidate-public convergence and the percent of 
vote won for both independents and all voters when considering the total candidate 
agenda (r=.466, p<.05 and r=.422 p<.05 respectively).  
Although there was not a significant correlation between the agendas when using 
the candidate television only agenda, there were two interesting points to note. In the case 
of independents and the candidate television only agenda, the correlation approached 
significance (r=.436, p=.052) given that for this analysis n=15, it is possible that a 
sample of more races would have produced a significant correlation. Also in both the 
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independent and all voter cases when the candidates who did not run television ads were 
not excluded and were considered to have 0 convergence, the correlation between 
candidate-public convergence and percent of the vote skyrocketed to r=.738 (p<.001) for 
independents and r=.658 (p<.001) for all voters.  
Table 4. Correlations between candidate-public convergence and percent vote 
 
Independents 
& total 
candidate 
Independents 
& candidate 
tv 
All voters & 
total 
candidate 
All voters & 
candidate tv 
Candidate tv 
n=15 
.466* .436
a
 .422* .377
a
 
Candidate tv n = 
18 
.466* .738** .422* .658** 
*p <.05, **p≤.001, a p <.10; n is the number of candidates with an agenda 
 
As a result of these findings, hypothesis 3 is supported when considering the total 
candidate agenda.  
This simply means that the higher a candidate‟s issue convergence with the 
public, the higher the percent of the vote they will receive. It is interesting to note that the 
correlation approached significance for the candidate television agenda, if future studies 
find a significant correlation in this measure it may indicate that issue convergence of 
candidate television advertisements bypass the intermediary effects of the media and 
have a direct impact on the outcome of an election. 
 It is also worth noting that when candidates who did not have television 
advertisements were included in the analysis and considered to have no convergence with 
the public, the significance of the relationship between candidate-public convergence and 
the vote skyrocketed. This may be due to several factors; primary among those factors is 
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the fact that these candidates were all minor party candidates with limited resources and 
therefore limited reach. It appears from these results that television advertising can be 
important in showing the public that candidates‟ do have similar issue agendas; therefore 
television advertising can be seen as a way to communicate convergence to the public.  
5.2.5 Research Question 2: Is there a relationship between candidate-media 
convergence and percentage of the vote won by that candidate? 
 To examine the relationship between candidate-media convergence and the 
percentage of the vote won by a candidate, correlations were run to compare these 
variables. Again, these correlations were run under four conditions: independent versus 
all voters vote percent and candidate total agenda versus candidate television only 
agenda. In each of these cases, there were no significant correlations. However, when 
candidate-media convergence and percentage of vote won was examined without 
considering the treasurer race, the correlation when considering the candidate-newspaper 
agenda approached significance (r=.449, p = .081, n=16 where n is the number 
candidates).  
 Given these results, there was no significant relationship found, however further 
research is needed to examine these variables with a larger sample size to reduce the 
statistical impact of measurement error and other anomalous data.  
 If future research finds a significant correlation between candidate-media 
convergence and the percentage of the vote won by the candidate, it may indicate that the 
agenda setting effect is strong enough that candidates can increase their electability by 
attenuating their agendas to match the media agenda.  
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5.3 Supplemental Analysis 
 Given that there is a significant correlation between candidate-media convergence 
and candidate-public convergence as well as a significant correlation between candidate-
public convergence and the percent of the vote won by candidates, logic would suggest 
that there would be a correlation between candidate-media convergence and the percent 
of vote won by candidates. However, since this is not the case in this sample, it becomes 
important to examine more closely the role of media-public convergence as an 
intermediary force. Supplemental analyses were conducted to explore the relationship 
between the media-public convergence and the candidate-public convergence as well as 
to examine the relationship between the media-public convergence and candidate-media 
convergence.  
5.3.1 Media-Public Convergence and Candidate-Public Convergence 
 To examine the relationship between media-public convergence and candidate-
public convergence a correlation analysis was conducted under the four scenarios for 
independents versus all voters and total candidate versus television only candidate 
agendas. The analysis found that for both independents and all voters when considering 
the total candidate agenda the candidate-public convergence scores were highly 
correlated with the media-public convergence scores with r ranging from .590 to .731 
where p<.01. When considering only the candidate television agenda however, there 
were no significant correlations.  
 This indicates that as the media agenda gets closer to the public agenda, the 
candidate‟s agendas are also likely to get closer to the public agenda. The proximity of 
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the media agenda to the public agenda is an artifact of agenda setting effects, therefore 
this data suggests that the stronger the agenda setting effects of the media are in an 
election, the more likely the candidate is to converge with the public as well. This is of 
course due to the effects of candidate-media agenda setting.  
Table 5.Media-Public and Candidate-Public Convergence 
 
All 
News 
TV 
News 
Newspaper Ch. 3 Ch. 5 Ch. 8 Ch. 19 
Independents 
and total 
candidate 
agenda 
(n=18) 
.715** .669** .731** .640** .647** .614** .721** 
Independents 
and 
candidate 
TV agenda 
(n=15) 
.087 .087 .124 .075 .043 .128 .198 
All voters 
and total 
candidate 
agenda 
(n=18) 
.684** .657** .723** .611** .632** .590** .667** 
All voters 
and 
candidate 
TV agenda 
(n=15) 
.014 .033 .106 .012 -.023 .052 .104 
** p <.01; n is the number of candidates, media-public agendas were constant within each 
race 
5.3.2 Media-Public and Candidate-Media Convergence 
 Having established a relationship between candidate-public and candidate-
newspaper convergence, between candidate-public convergence and vote choice and 
between candidate-public and media-candidate convergence but with a non-significant 
relationship between candidate-media convergence and vote choice, the last key 
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correlation to examine is the relationship between the media-public convergence and 
candidate-media convergence.  
 As has been the case in the previous tests, the analysis was run under four 
conditions; as in the previous tests, the candidate television agenda revealed no 
significant correlations. However for both the independent and total public agenda there 
were several significant correlations between media-public and candidate-media 
convergence as shown in Tables 6 and 7.  
Table 6. Media- Total Public and Total Candidate-Media Convergence Correlations 
 Public- 
All 
News 
Public- 
TV 
News 
Public- 
Newspaper 
Public- 
Ch. 3 
Public- 
Ch. 5 
Public- 
Ch.8 
Public- 
Ch.19 
Candidate- 
All News 
.531* .554* .413
a 
.593** .567* .508* .401
a
 
Candidate- 
TV News 
N.S. .465
a
 N.S. .448
a
 .406
a
 .484* N.S. 
Candidate- 
Newspaper 
.628** .596** .603** .668** .676** .485* .417
a
 
Candidate- 
Ch.3 
N.S. .423
a
 N.S. .454
a
 N.S. .437
a
 N.S. 
Candidate- 
Ch.5 
N.S. N.S. N.S. .413
a
 .412
a
 N.S. N.S. 
Candidate- 
Ch.8 
N.S. .411
a
 N.S. N.S. N.S. .476* N.S. 
Candidate- 
Ch.19 
.572* .661** N.S. .580* .569* .671** .639** 
*p≤.05; **p≤.01; ap≤.10; n = 18; n is the number of candidates, media-public agendas 
were constant within each race 
The significant correlations here show that under certain circumstances the more that 
candidates‟ agendas converge with the media, the more the public agendas will converge 
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with the media. This is likely an artifact of the relationships between both candidate-
media convergence and media-public convergence with candidate-public convergence as 
illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. The fact that the pattern of significance is consistent across 
candidate-media convergence, but not across media-public convergence, may indicate 
that candidate-media convergence is the intermediary force that causes the relationship 
between candidate-public and media-public convergence. In other words, unless the 
candidate attenuates his or her agenda to converge with the media, their convergence with 
the public will not be related to the media-public convergence or subject to the effects of 
traditional agenda setting.  
Table 7. Media- Independent Public and Total Candidate-Media Convergence 
Correlations 
 Public- 
All 
News 
Public- 
TV 
News 
Public- 
Newspaper 
Public- 
Ch. 3 
Public- 
Ch. 5 
Public- 
Ch.8 
Public- 
Ch.19 
Candidate- 
All News 
.509* .561* .401
a
 .591** .560* .532* .422
a
 
Candidate- 
TV News 
N.S. .450
a
 N.S. .426
a
 N.S. .491* N.S. 
Candidate- 
Newspaper 
.629** .626** .599** .692** .685** .526* .462
a
 
Candidate- 
Ch.3 
N.S. .411
a
 N.S. .426
a
 N.S. .447
a
 N.S. 
Candidate- 
Ch.5 
N.S. .402
a
 N.S. .414
a
 .404
a
 N.S. N.S. 
Candidate- 
Ch.8 
N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. N.S. .466
a
 N.S. 
Candidate- 
Ch.19 
.550* .646** N.S. .570* .554* .682** .640** 
*p≤.05; **p≤.01; ap≤.10; n = 18; n is the number of candidates, media-public agendas 
were constant within each race  
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION 
6.1 Hypotheses and Research Questions 
This thesis generally sought to examine first how convergence scores can be used 
to add deeper meaning to agenda setting research and second how those convergence 
scores can be used to explain how voters choose which candidate to vote for. Given the 
fact that this research was aggregated in such a way that the unit of analysis was the 
individual race or candidate, the resulting n for each of the analyses was exceptionally 
low, with a range from n=15 to n=18. Having such a small sample size makes it 
incredibly difficult to detect significant results, but the analysis did uncover several 
significant relationships that were conceptually consistent with the agenda setting 
literature. 
The fact that the relationships found in this study were significant for both the 
independent only and total public agendas suggest that these effects may be stronger than 
weak partisanship. However, it may also simply be an artifact of the nature of the issues 
at play in this election and further studies would need to be conducted under various 
political climates to validate that possibility.  
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6.1.1 Hypothesis 1: The convergence score between the media and public agenda will 
be greater than 50. 
This research has established a baseline convergence score to represent the 
magnitude of the agenda setting function of the media. In almost every case, the media-
public convergence was above 50 with the peak convergence being between the 
newspaper and the public at 81 and 83 for the total public and independents respectively 
in the gubernatorial race. In 5 of the 7 races, the newspaper agenda had the highest 
convergence among the 7 media sources, which is consistent with the agenda setting 
literature that suggests that the print media exhibit a stronger agenda setting effect than 
the television media (Ridout & Mellen, 2007; Roberts, 1992). These convergence scores 
indicate not only a baseline convergence measure for agenda setting research, but they 
also indicate variations between agendas based on the media source and the type of race. 
Of particular note is that the County Executive convergence score was generally lower 
than the convergence score for statewide or national races. This may indicate that in local 
races when the public is closer to the issues, the media may be less effective in setting the 
public agenda.  
6.1.2 Hypothesis 2: The convergence score between each of the candidate 
agendas and the media agenda will be greater than the media-public convergence score. 
The research suggested that due to the reciprocal nature of agenda setting between 
candidates and the media, the candidate-media convergence would be higher than the 
media-public convergence score. This was the case for 5 of the 7 media sources when 
considering the total public agenda but only 2 of the 7 media sources when considering 
the independent only public agenda.  In both cases however, there was a significant 
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relationship between the candidate-all media convergence and the all media-public 
convergence. This suggests that while the agenda setting effect varies across the media 
sources, the reciprocal nature of candidate-media agenda setting is cumulative across the 
various media sources and not localized to any particular media source.  
6.1.3 Research Question 1: What is the relationship between the candidate-media 
convergence and the candidate-public convergence? 
The only significant correlations between candidate-media convergence and 
candidate-public convergence occurred when considering the candidate-newspaper 
convergence. This indicates that the higher the convergence between candidates and the 
newspaper, the higher the convergence between candidates and the public. This 
relationship occurs for both the total public and independent only public agenda and 
indicates the possibility of a process model for agenda setting by which candidates can 
enhance their convergence with the public by using the newspaper as an indicator of the 
public agenda. 
6.1.4 Hypothesis 3: There will be a significant positive correlation between the 
candidate-public convergence score and the percentage of the vote won by that 
candidate. 
The research shows a significant correlation between candidate-public issue 
convergence and the choice of voters, regardless of the specific stance of the candidate on 
those issues. This suggests that by increasing candidate-public issue convergence a 
candidate can increase the percent of the vote he or she will win. The correlation was 
significant for both all voters and independents only and this was the only analysis that 
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approached significance for the candidate television agenda (n=15) condition. This 
indicates that the convergence of the television advertising agenda of a candidate with the 
public may have an impact on the vote; it may also indicate that television advertising is a 
very important medium through which the existence of candidate-public convergence is 
communicated to the public.  
6.1.5 Research Question 2: Is there a relationship between candidate-media 
convergence and percentage of the vote won by that candidate? 
There was no significant correlation between candidate-media convergence and 
the percentage of the vote won by candidates. As noted in section 5.1.5, the absence of a 
significant correlation between candidate-media convergence and the percent of the vote 
is likely an artifact of the small n and error in the measurement of the treasurer agendas. 
The fact that the correlation approached significance when withholding the treasurer data 
points indicates that a larger n and corrective coding may reveal a significant relationship. 
6.2 Supplemental Analysis 
6.2.1 Media-Public Convergence and Candidate-Public Convergence 
There were significant correlations between the media-public convergence and 
candidate-public convergence scores in both cases when considering the total candidate 
agenda for both the total public and independent only public conditions. There were no 
significant correlations with the television only candidate agenda. These results are an 
artifact of traditional media-public agenda setting effects and they indicate that stronger 
agenda setting effects enable candidates to increase their convergence with the public.   
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6.2.2 Media-Public and Candidate-Media Convergence 
 This analysis showed a significant correlation between the candidate-newspaper 
convergence and nearly all media-public convergence measures for both independents 
and the total public agenda. It also found that the candidate-all media convergence was 
correlated with most media-public convergence measures for both independents and the 
total public agenda. This indicates that the newspapers may play a role in setting the 
agenda of other news media sources.  
 When this result is combined with the result from the test in section 5.2.1, it 
suggests that the media-public convergence, otherwise known as traditional agenda 
setting effects, serves as an intermediary between the candidate and the public. Therefore, 
this study provides strong evidence that candidates can increase their convergence with 
the public by increasing their convergence with media. A more detailed description of 
this process can be found in section 6.6.  
 Despite the failure of candidate-media convergence to correlate significantly with 
vote choice, the fact that this analysis approached significance when withholding the 
Treasurer‟s race seems to suggest that a relationship exists that was not detected in this 
study due to the small n and measurement error in the Treasurer‟s race.  
 6.3 Relationships between the various convergence scores and vote choice 
 The previous analyses have drawn a complex picture of relationships between 
candidate, media and public agendas and the vote choice. In order to better visualize 
these relationships, it is helpful to graphically represent the relationships as a macro 
model analysis as is done in Figures 1 and 2. Note that the media-public convergence 
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could not be correlated with vote choice because media-public convergence relates to the 
races as a whole, while vote choice relates to individual candidates. Conceptually, a 
relationship between these two variables would not be expected to exist. For example, in 
any given race vote choice would be divided between the candidates, one would 
inevitably win a larger percentage of the vote. However media-public convergence is 
measured at the level of the race, since the issues remain consistent within a given race. 
Therefore, the media-public convergence would be identical for all candidates within a 
given race while the vote choice would split unevenly in each race.  
Figure 1. Total Candidate-Independent Public Model 
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Figure 2. Total Candidate – Total Public Model 
 
6.4 Limitations 
 This study is limited in several ways; first and foremost the small n of 15 to 18 at 
the aggregate level made it incredibly difficult to detect smaller relationships and wash 
out measurement error. As noted, there was a measurement error in determining the 
treasurer agendas due to coding military references literally as veteran‟s issues rather than 
considering those mentions as proxies for experience and responsibility. Because this 
error was not detected until after the questionnaires were sent, it was impossible to use 
corrective coding on the content analysis portion of the research without distorting the 
convergence scores with the public agenda. 
 Additionally, by limiting the research to content issued one month prior to the 
election, the analysis did not include several early political advertisements that certainly 
contributed to the candidate agendas. By focusing on the candidate website and television 
advertisements, several modes of campaign communication were missed by the analysis. 
This is particularly important when considering down-ticket and more local races that 
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depend more on mailings, stump speeches and interpersonal communications to deliver 
campaign messages. 
  Further limitations include the fact that the survey was delayed at the post office, 
resulting in respondents answering the survey questions after learning who the winner of 
the elections were, which opens the vote totals to the threat of social desirability bias. The 
fact that the response rate for the survey was under 10% opens the survey data to the 
threat of response bias and the selection criteria of areas with a high census response rate 
did have an effect on the demographic diversity of respondents.  
This analysis was limited in context to the 2010 general election in Cuyahoga 
County and to the individual races studied. This election was a highly partisan race, in 
which the overwhelming majority of winning candidates were Republicans; while 
limiting the sample to independents limited the effect of strong partisanship, it cannot be 
ignored as a contextual limitation on this study. Further studies should seek to conduct 
similar research in races that swing heavily Democratic and those that have a less partisan 
bias. For a further discussion of the context of this election, please see Appendix G.  
Because this analysis was conducted at the aggregate, campaign and candidate, 
level the study is limited in the insights it can provide on the individual level processes 
from which these aggregate findings resulted. An individual level analysis of 
convergence coupled with the additional consideration of individual level decision-
making theories would be required to garner those insights.  
 There were difficulties in comparing aggregate data to individual data to 
determine the relationship between convergence and partisanship. In order to accomplish 
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this, an individual convergence score would need to be calculated, such an analysis could 
be done with the data from this study; however it is a large enough undertaking to justify 
a separate study.  
 Lastly, the sample in this study was overwhelmingly older and white, while this 
demographic appears to adequately represent active, independent voters in Cuyahoga 
County it may not be a representative sample of active, independent voters in other areas. 
 6.5 Directions for Future Research 
 Future research should consider repeating this study‟s methodology in the context 
of a much larger number of races, particularly among races of the same type. It may be 
valuable to conduct this study nationwide in congressional districts that are known to 
change hands frequently. In the field of agenda setting, there is a great deal of research 
that can be conducted using the convergence scores to examine the real-world effects of 
agenda setting, a serial longitudinal study that tracks media-public convergence over time 
would be valuable to show the relationships between the traditional correlative research 
and convergence. 
Other researchers may consider conducting a full path analysis of the 
relationships between the convergence scores to develop a more complete model of how 
agenda setting can be used to affect the outcome of an election. If such research was 
conducted with this data, it would be expected that the relationships would appear as 
shown in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3. Expected Path of Relationships 
 
 Future research should seriously examine the findings of research question 2 in an 
attempt to detect this relationship with a larger N. The research does strongly suggest that 
a relationship should exist between candidate-media convergence and vote choice.  
 Given that this study focused on independent voters, it would be worthwhile for 
future research to consider examining partisan voters as well. It would be expected that 
both strong Democrats and strong Republicans would behave similarly but in opposite 
directions, the most interesting relationship to examine in such an analysis would be the 
differences between independents and strong partisans.  
 Lastly, future research should consider modifying the convergence calculation to 
determine individual level convergence scores between candidates or media and 
individual survey respondents to produce a richer data set and enhance the ability to 
control analyses for individual level differences such as partisanship, race, gender, 
education and socioeconomic status. Additionally, individual level analysis of this 
Candidate-Public Convergence 
Vote Choice 
Candidate-Media Convergence Media-Public Convergence 
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process may enable the model to be expanded to incorporate decision making process 
models such as the elaboration likelihood model or others to explain how and why these 
relationships occur in individual voters. An individual level analysis would also provide 
large dataset to consider which would enable the detection of less powerful effects and 
add certainty to the effects which were found to be significant with an n of 15 or 18.  
 6.6 Conclusions 
 The stated intent of this study was to attempt to identify potential campaign 
tactics to reach independent voters more effectively. The research has suggested that 
candidates and campaign consultants may be able to reach independents by increasing 
their issue convergence with that of the newspaper. When the candidate converges with 
the local newspaper, their likelihood of converging with the independent public increases; 
given that convergence with the public is correlated with vote choice, this model is likely 
to improve a candidate‟s performance at the polls. Candidates may take advantage of this 
process by carefully monitoring issue salience in newspapers and attenuating their 
message strategy when communicating with voters to converge with the newspaper 
agenda.  
 The results of this study are consistent with the prior research in that it has shown 
a stronger agenda setting effect in the print media (Ridout & Mellen, 2007; Roberts, 
1992). It is also consistent with the limited convergence score literature related to 
candidate-media convergence in showing that candidate-newspaper convergence is 
higher than candidate-television news convergence and that media-candidate 
convergence tends to be above 50 (Hayes, 2009).  
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 This study has found that convergence scores are a valuable resource in 
examining agenda setting effects and suggested that complex relationships between 
agendas and outcomes can be more easily examined and translated into actionable 
strategies when using a convergence measure.  
 The fact that this study found many significant results despite a small n indicates 
the strength of the relationships uncovered. Although the research question at the logical 
end of the series of research questions and hypotheses in this analysis did not find 
significant results, the data suggests that further research may reveal evidence of a 
powerful model through which to use the agenda setting effect to tip the outcome of an 
election.   
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
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COMMUNICATION AND POLITICS SURVEY 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate.  When answering the questions, please circle or 
mark the number that best represents your answer.  Although answering every question 
is preferable, you have the right to skip any question that you do not want to answer. 
Please read all instructions carefully and answer each question as accurately as possible.  
 
 
The following questions ask about your media use, please select all responses that 
apply. 
 
1. How much attention do you pay to state and local political news? (Circle one number) 
 
None at all             A lot 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
2.How much attention do you pay to state and local political news on LOCAL 
TELEVISION? 
 
None at all             A lot 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
3.How much attention do you pay to state and local political news in LOCAL 
NEWSPAPERS? 
 
None at all             A lot 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
4.How much attention do you pay to state and local political news ONLINE? 
 
None at all             A lot 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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The following questions ask about who you voted for in the 2010 General Election, 
held on November 2, 2010. Please select only one answer for each question. 
 
5. Did you vote in the 2010 General Election, either at the polls or by mail? If NO, skip to 
the end. 
 
  Yes, I voted       No, I did not vote 
 
6. In the race for Ohio Governor, who did you vote for? (Select only one) 
 
 John Kasich (R)  Ted Strickland (D)         
 
7. In the race for Ohio Secretary of State, who did you vote for? (Select only one) 
 
Jon Husted (R)  Maryellen O‟Shaughnessy (D)        
 
8. In the race for Ohio Attorney General, who did you vote for? (Select only one) 
 
Richard Cordray (D)      Mike Dewine (R)   
 
 
9. In the race for Ohio Treasurer, who did you vote for? (Select only one) 
 
 Kevin Boyce (D)      Josh Mandel (R)     
  
 
10. In the race for Ohio Auditor, who did you vote for? (Select only one) 
 
 David Pepper (D)      Dave Yost (R)   
 
11. In the race for United States Senate, who did you vote for? (Select only one) 
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  Lee Fisher (D)     Rob Portman (R)     
  
 
12. In the race for Cuyahoga County Executive, who did you vote for? (Select only one) 
 
Matt Dolan (R)  David Ellison (G)  Ed Fitzgerald (D)     
  
 
Ken Lanci (I)  Tim McCormack (I)  Don Scipione (I) 
 
The following questions ask about your awareness of political advertising in this 
election, please select only one answer. 
 
13. How aware were you of advertisements for either candidate for Ohio Governor? 
(Circle one number) 
 
Not at all aware Somewhat aware    Very aware 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
14. How aware were you of advertisements for either candidate for Ohio Secretary of 
State?  
 
Not at all aware      Somewhat aware    Very aware 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
15. How aware were you of advertisements for either candidate for Ohio Attorney 
General?  
 
Not at all aware      Somewhat aware    Very aware 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
16. How aware were you of advertisements for either candidate for Ohio Treasurer?  
 
Not at all aware      Somewhat aware    Very aware 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
17. How aware were you of advertisements for either candidate for Ohio Auditor?  
 
Not at all aware      Somewhat aware    Very aware 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
18. How aware were you of advertisements for either candidate for United States Senate?  
 
Not at all aware      Somewhat aware    Very aware 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
19. How aware were you of advertisements for any candidate for Cuyahoga County 
Executive?  
 
Not at all aware      Somewhat aware    Very aware 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
The following questions ask you to identify the issues that you considered VERY 
IMPORTANT when deciding which candidate to vote for in each race. Please select 
every issue that you considered VERY IMPORTANT when making your decision.  
 
20. In the race for OHIO GOVERNOR, place a check mark next to every issue that you 
considered VERY IMPORTANT when deciding which candidate to vote for.  (Select all 
that apply) 
 
 JobsState Budget         EducationTaxesHealth Care Gun Rights 
Veterans Affairs         Wall StreetGovernment Efficiency/Size 3C Train 
Others (specify): _______________________________________ 
21. In the race for OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, place a check mark next to every 
issue that you considered VERY IMPORTANT when deciding which candidate to vote 
for.  (Select all that apply) 
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JobsFair ElectionsElection Participation Size and Cost of 
GovernmentTaxes 
Experience Redistricting/Reform Political Background Free Speech Issues  
Others (specify): _________________________ 
 
22. In the race for OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, place a check mark next to every 
issue that you considered VERY IMPORTANT when deciding which candidate to vote 
for.  (Select all that apply) 
 
Crime/Law enforcement    Corruption       Wall Street     Reform       
Jobs 
Experience       Education             Gun Rights       Abortion 
Others (specify):________________________ 
 
23. In the race for OHIO TREASURER, place a check mark next to every issue that you 
considered VERY IMPORTANT when deciding which candidate to vote for.  (Select all 
that apply) 
 
Jobs Experience CorruptionFiscal Responsibility       Financial Education        
Terrorism        Veterans Affairs Others (specify):_________________________ 
 
 
 
24. In the race for OHIO AUDITOR, place a check mark next to every issue that you 
considered VERY IMPORTANT when deciding which candidate to vote for.  (Select all 
that apply) 
 
Taxes Jobs Corruption       Wasteful Spending Reform 
ExperienceIndependence Crime Infrastructure 
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Others (specify):_________________________ 
 
 
25. In the race for UNITED STATES SENATE, place a check mark next to every issue 
that you considered VERY IMPORTANT when deciding which candidate to vote for.  
(Select all that apply) 
 
 JobsHealth CareEducation       Foreign Trade       Budget Deficit 
TaxesMilitary IssuesReformEnergy 
Others (specify):____________________ 
26. In the race for CUYAHOGA COUNTY EXECUTIVE, place a check mark next to 
every issue that you considered VERY IMPORTANT when deciding which candidate to 
vote for.  (Select all that apply) 
 
Jobs/Economy       Corruption       Reform       Health & Human Services
 Education 
Independence        Foreclosures  Leadership/Experience Public Safety 
Medical Mart Others (specify): _____________________________ 
The following questions ask about your media use, please select all answers that 
apply. 
 
27. Where do you go to get information about state and local politics? 
 
 Television News       Radio       Newspapers        Online Newspapers      
Candidate Websites       
 
Candidate pages on Facebook/Twitter         Online Blogs       I don‟t know     
Other:___________ 
 
28. If you get state and local political information from television news, what stations do 
you watch most? 
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 WKYC-Channel 3     WEWS – Channel 5       WJW- Channel 8        WOIO – 
Channel 19/43      
 
Other: __________________         I don‟t know/don‟t get political news from TV 
 
29. If you get state and local political information from newspapers, what newspapers do 
you read most? 
 
 The Plain Dealer       Cleveland Scene       Sun Newspapers        Crain‟s Cleveland 
Business       
 
Other:_________________         I do not get local political news from newspapers 
 
30. If you get state and local political information from online news, what online news do 
you read most? 
 
 The Plain Dealer Online               Cleveland Scene Online                Sun Newspapers 
Online    
 
Other:_____________    Crain‟s Cleveland Business Online  I do not get local 
political news online  
31. On average, how many days per week did you pay attention to local political news 
from any source during this election? (circle one) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
The following questions ask about your demographics, please select only the one 
answer that best applies. 
 
32. The terms "liberal" and "conservative" may mean different things to people, 
depending on the kind of issue one is considering.  In terms of political issues, would you 
say you are: 
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 Very Liberal      Liberal Moderate Conservative Very Conservative I Don‟t 
Know 
 
33.How old are you? 
Write your age in years: _______ 
 
34. Over the last few elections that you have voted in where there was both a Democrat 
and Republican candidate, which candidate did you choose more frequently? 
 
 I tend to vote for Democrats  I tend to vote for an equal number   I tend to 
vote for Republicans 
of Democrats and Republicans 
 
 I have not voted in this type of election recently 
 
35. Are you MALE or FEMALE?  (1) MALE  (2) FEMALE 
 
36. Which of the following do you consider yourself to be: (Check only one) 
(1) American Indian or Alaskan Native  
(2) Asian or Pacific Islander 
(3) Black or African-American--not of Hispanic Origin 
(4) Hispanic  
(5) White--not of Hispanic Origin 
(6) Middle-Eastern/Arabic 
(7) Other: _______________________ 
 
 
THIS COMPLETES OUR SURVEY.  
 
PLEASE PLACE THIS SURVEY IN THE POSTAGE-PAID REPLY ENVELOPE  
WE HAVE PROVIDED AND RETURN IT TO US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 
 
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING!  
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October 25, 2010 
 
Dear Cuyahoga County Voter: 
 
I am a researcher in the School of Communications at Cleveland State University 
and I am investigating how voter perceptions of campaigns affect the outcome of the 
2010 general election in Cuyahoga County. Working under the direction of Leo W. 
Jeffres, Ph.D., it is my hope that your responses will help me complete a Master’s 
thesis that has taken over a year to develop.  
 
Dr. Jeffres and I are asking you to complete the enclosed survey which being given to 
voters like you who live in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. The survey will take about 15 
minutes to complete and it will ask questions about your political activity in this 
election. 
 
Your responses will be confidential and will be combined with others’ responses for 
use in a research project which may be published and presented in the future. Your 
name will not be collected or reported in any published or presented version of the 
research project.  
 
Your complete privacy is guaranteed. Your participation is completely voluntary and 
you are not required to answer any questions asked. There is no reward for 
participating or consequence for not participating and there are no risks associated 
with this survey other than those experienced during normal political discourse.  
 
For further information regarding this research please contact Jonathan Simon at 
(216)687-4629 or via email at J.M.Simon80@csuohio.edu or you can contact my 
advisor, Leo W. Jeffres at (216)687-5088 or via email at L.Jeffres@csuohio.edu.  
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant you may contact 
the Cleveland State University Institutional Review Board at (216)687-3630. 
 
By returning this survey in the enclosed, postage paid envelope you are agreeing that 
you are 18 years or older, have read and understood this letter and agree to allow your 
responses to be included in this study for which the results will be published. 
 
Please make sure that you fill out the survey within a few hours of voting, or if you 
have already voted please fill out the survey and return it in the enclosed envelope 
before November 2nd.  
 
For your convenience you may take this survey online instead of mailing back the 
paper copy. Please visit www.surveymonkey.com/CSUelectionsurvey2010for the 
online version.  
 
Thank you in advance for your cooperation and support. 
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-Jonathan Simon 
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Media Agendas 
 
 
 
 
 
All News TV News Newspapers Ch. 3 Ch. 5 Ch. 8 Ch. 19
AG
AG > Abortion 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
AG > Corruption 7% 4% 11% 3% 2% 3% 6%
AG > Crime/Law Enforcement 11% 12% 11% 8% 10% 10% 19%
AG > Education 33% 42% 23% 48% 39% 46% 32%
AG > Experience 12% 10% 15% 10% 10% 10% 9%
AG > Gun Rights 4% 4% 3% 2% 5% 4% 7%
AG > Jobs 21% 18% 24% 17% 22% 17% 17%
AG > Reform 5% 5% 4% 5% 5% 5% 7%
AG > Wall Street 7% 5% 8% 6% 7% 5% 4%
Attorney General
All News TV News Newspapers Ch. 3 Ch. 5 Ch. 8 Ch. 19
Auditor
Auditor > Corruption 10% 6% 13% 6% 4% 6% 10%
Auditor > Crime 8% 10% 6% 6% 9% 9% 16%
Auditor > Experience 16% 16% 16% 17% 15% 18% 14%
Auditor > Independence 2% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Auditor > Infrastructure 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 2% 0%
Auditor > Jobs 35% 38% 33% 38% 44% 36% 34%
Auditor > Reform 6% 9% 4% 9% 8% 10% 11%
Auditor > Taxes 10% 6% 13% 9% 5% 6% 6%
Auditor > Wasteful Spending 12% 12% 11% 13% 13% 13% 9%
Auditor
All News TV News Newspapers Ch. 3 Ch. 5 Ch. 8 Ch. 19
County Executive
County Executive > Corruption 6% 3% 10% 3% 2% 2% 5%
County Executive > Education 27% 32% 20% 39% 28% 35% 24%
County Executive > Foreclosures 2% 1% 4% 2% 1% 1% 0%
County Executive > Health and Human Services 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 2% 1%
County Executive > Independence 1% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0%
County Executive > Jobs 21% 17% 25% 18% 20% 15% 16%
County Executive > Leadership/Experience 12% 9% 15% 10% 9% 9% 7%
County Executive > Medical Mart 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
County Executive > Public Safety 25% 31% 17% 20% 31% 31% 40%
County Executive > Reform 4% 5% 4% 5% 4% 4% 5%
County Executive
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All News TV News Newspapers Ch. 3 Ch. 5 Ch. 8 Ch. 19
Governor
Governor > 3C Train 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Governor > Education 29% 37% 21% 41% 33% 39% 32%
Governor > Government Efficiency/Size 7% 6% 8% 6% 7% 6% 6%
Governor > Gun Rights 3% 4% 3% 2% 4% 4% 7%
Governor > Health Care 15% 18% 12% 15% 17% 22% 19%
Governor > Jobs 23% 20% 26% 19% 24% 17% 23%
Governor > State Budget 6% 3% 8% 4% 4% 3% 2%
Governor > Taxes 7% 3% 10% 5% 3% 3% 4%
Governor > Veterans Affairs 4% 3% 4% 4% 2% 3% 3%
Governor > Wall Street 6% 5% 7% 5% 6% 4% 4%
Governor
All News TV News Newspapers Ch. 3 Ch. 5 Ch. 8 Ch. 19
Senate
Senate > Budget Deficit 7% 4% 9% 5% 5% 4% 3%
Senate > Education 32% 39% 24% 42% 35% 41% 34%
Senate > Energy 1% 1% 2% 1% 2% 1% 2%
Senate > Foreign Trade 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0%
Senate > Health Care 17% 19% 13% 15% 18% 23% 20%
Senate > Jobs 25% 20% 29% 19% 25% 17% 23%
Senate > Military Issues 7% 6% 7% 7% 7% 6% 6%
Senate > Reform 5% 5% 4% 5% 4% 5% 8%
Senate > Taxes 7% 4% 11% 5% 3% 3% 4%
Senate
All News TV News Newspapers Ch. 3 Ch. 5 Ch. 8 Ch. 19
SOS
SOS > Election Participation 1% 1% 0% 2% 1% 1% 1%
SOS > Experience 8% 11% 6% 8% 12% 14% 8%
SOS > Fair Elections 4% 5% 2% 4% 4% 3% 9%
SOS > Free Speech Issues 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
SOS > Government Size/Cost 13% 13% 13% 14% 14% 14% 11%
SOS > Jobs 40% 42% 38% 40% 47% 40% 40%
SOS > Political Background 16% 11% 20% 12% 8% 10% 12%
SOS > Redistricting/Reform 7% 10% 5% 10% 8% 11% 13%
SOS > Taxes 11% 7% 15% 10% 6% 6% 7%
SOS
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Candidate Total Agendas by Race 
 
 
 
All News TV News Newspapers Ch. 3 Ch. 5 Ch. 8 Ch. 19
Treasurer
Treasurer > Corruption 16% 10% 21% 9% 6% 8% 16%
Treasurer > Experience 10% 11% 9% 9% 10% 13% 10%
Treasurer > Financial Education 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Treasurer > Fiscal Responsibility 5% 6% 4% 6% 3% 8% 6%
Treasurer > Jobs 56% 58% 54% 61% 71% 51% 54%
Treasurer > Race/Religion 2% 1% 2% 0% 0% 3% 2%
Treasurer > Terrorism 2% 5% 0% 3% 4% 7% 4%
Treasurer > Veterans Affairs 9% 9% 9% 12% 5% 10% 7%
Treasurer
Issue Cordray Dewine
AG
AG > Abortion 0% 3%
AG > Corruption 16% 27%
AG > Crime/Law Enforcement 34% 24%
AG > Education 10% 15%
AG > Experience 15% 6%
AG > Gun Rights 0% 3%
AG > Jobs 16% 18%
AG > Reform 0% 4%
AG > Wall Street 9% 0%
Attorney General
Issue Pepper Yost
Auditor
Auditor > Corruption 19% 13%
Auditor > Crime 18% 5%
Auditor > Experience 8% 21%
Auditor > Independence 2% 0%
Auditor > Infrastructure 1% 0%
Auditor > Jobs 14% 21%
Auditor > Reform 5% 0%
Auditor > Taxes 10% 15%
Auditor > Wasteful Spending 23% 26%
Auditor
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Issue Dolan Ellison Fitzgerald Lanci McCormack Scipione
County Executive
County Executive > Corruption 4% 1% 3% 9% 0% 1%
County Executive > Education 12% 20% 17% 6% 24% 33%
County Executive > Foreclosures 1% 0% 1% 2% 0% 4%
County Executive > Health and Human Services 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 2%
County Executive > Independence 5% 4% 1% 5% 0% 2%
County Executive > Jobs 43% 65% 56% 50% 23% 41%
County Executive > Leadership/Experience 12% 8% 11% 18% 19% 12%
County Executive > Medical Mart 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
County Executive > Public Safety 7% 2% 9% 3% 23% 0%
County Executive > Reform 14% 0% 1% 7% 11% 4%
County Executive
Issue Kasich Strickland
Governor
Governor > 3C Train 0% 0%
Governor > Education 8% 35%
Governor > Government Efficiency/Size 17% 3%
Governor > Gun Rights 10% 0%
Governor > Health Care 6% 7%
Governor > Jobs 34% 30%
Governor > State Budget 13% 4%
Governor > Taxes 10% 13%
Governor > Veterans Affairs 2% 3%
Governor > Wall Street 2% 4%
Governor
Issue Fisher Portman
Senate
Senate > Budget Deficit 4% 10%
Senate > Education 12% 5%
Senate > Energy 7% 13%
Senate > Foreign Trade 2% 0%
Senate > Health Care 20% 9%
Senate > Jobs 38% 43%
Senate > Military Issues 5% 7%
Senate > Reform 5% 3%
Senate > Taxes 6% 9%
Senate
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Candidate Television Only Agendas by Race 
 
 
Issue Husted Oshaughnessey
SOS
SOS > Election Participation 0% 1%
SOS > Experience 2% 11%
SOS > Fair Elections 6% 19%
SOS > Free Speech Issues 0% 0%
SOS > Government Size/Cost 9% 3%
SOS > Jobs 38% 38%
SOS > Political Background 12% 18%
SOS > Redistricting/Reform 7% 4%
SOS > Taxes 26% 6%
Secretary of State
Issue Boyce Mandel
Treasurer
Treasurer > Corruption 0% 4%
Treasurer > Experience 10% 21%
Treasurer > Financial Education 0% 0%
Treasurer > Fiscal Responsibility 10% 8%
Treasurer > Jobs 66% 12%
Treasurer > Race/Religion 15% 1%
Treasurer > Terrorism 0% 9%
Treasurer > Veterans Affairs 0% 44%
Treasurer
Issue Cordray Dewine
AG
AG > Abortion 0% 0%
AG > Corruption 23% 54%
AG > Crime/Law Enforcement 23% 8%
AG > Education 0% 8%
AG > Experience 46% 0%
AG > Gun Rights 0% 0%
AG > Jobs 8% 23%
AG > Reform 0% 8%
AG > Wall Street 0% 0%
Attorney General
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Issue Pepper Yost
Auditor
Auditor > Corruption 11% 5%
Auditor > Crime 11% 5%
Auditor > Experience 0% 16%
Auditor > Independence 11% 0%
Auditor > Infrastructure 0% 0%
Auditor > Jobs 0% 16%
Auditor > Reform 0% 0%
Auditor > Taxes 22% 21%
Auditor > Wasteful Spending 44% 37%
Auditor
Issue Dolan Ellison Fitzgerald Lanci McCormack Scipione
County Executive
County Executive > Corruption 23% 0% 67% 0% 0% 0%
County Executive > Education 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
County Executive > Foreclosures 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
County Executive > Health and Human Services 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
County Executive > Independence 8% 0% 17% 28% 0% 0%
County Executive > Jobs 15% 0% 0% 44% 0% 0%
County Executive > Leadership/Experience 8% 0% 17% 22% 0% 0%
County Executive > Medical Mart 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
County Executive > Public Safety 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
County Executive > Reform 46% 0% 0% 6% 0% 0%
County Executive
Issue Kasich Strickland
Governor
Governor > 3C Train 0% 0%
Governor > Education 0% 16%
Governor > Government Efficiency/Size 7% 0%
Governor > Gun Rights 0% 0%
Governor > Health Care 0% 0%
Governor > Jobs 73% 60%
Governor > State Budget 17% 0%
Governor > Taxes 2% 8%
Governor > Veterans Affairs 0% 0%
Governor > Wall Street 0% 16%
Governor
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Issue Fisher Portman
Senate
Senate > Budget Deficit 29% 13%
Senate > Education 0% 0%
Senate > Energy 0% 0%
Senate > Foreign Trade 18% 0%
Senate > Health Care 0% 2%
Senate > Jobs 35% 78%
Senate > Military Issues 0% 0%
Senate > Reform 0% 4%
Senate > Taxes 18% 2%
Senate
Issue Husted Oshaughnessey
SOS
SOS > Election Participation 0% 0%
SOS > Experience 14% 43%
SOS > Fair Elections 0% 29%
SOS > Free Speech Issues 0% 0%
SOS > Government Size/Cost 29% 0%
SOS > Jobs 0% 14%
SOS > Political Background 14% 0%
SOS > Redistricting/Reform 0% 14%
SOS > Taxes 43% 0%
Secretary of State
Issue Boyce Mandel
Treasurer
Treasurer > Corruption 0% 10%
Treasurer > Experience 12% 14%
Treasurer > Financial Education 0% 0%
Treasurer > Fiscal Responsibility 0% 19%
Treasurer > Jobs 53% 14%
Treasurer > Race/Religion 35% 5%
Treasurer > Terrorism 0% 0%
Treasurer > Veterans Affairs 0% 38%
Treasurer
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Total Public Agenda 
 
Public
Governor
Governor > 3C Train 1.16%
Governor > Education 15.12%
Governor > Government Efficiency/Size 10.81%
Governor > Gun Rights 1.86%
Governor > Health Care 11.98%
Governor > Jobs 22.09%
Governor > State Budget 15.35%
Governor > Taxes 17.33%
Governor > Veterans Affairs 2.21%
Governor > Wall Street 2.09%
Governor
SOS Public
SOS > Election Participation 4.70%
SOS > Experience 9.76%
SOS > Fair Elections 14.98%
SOS > Free Speech Issues 1.57%
SOS > Government Size/Cost 17.94%
SOS > Jobs 19.51%
SOS > Political Background 8.19%
SOS > Redistricting/Reform 7.49%
SOS > Taxes 15.85%
SOS
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AG Public
AG > Abortion 3.09%
AG > Corruption 23.88%
AG > Crime/Law Enforcement 21.99%
AG > Education 8.76%
AG > Experience 14.78%
AG > Gun Rights 3.09%
AG > Jobs 13.23%
AG > Reform 8.93%
AG > Wall Street 2.23%
Attorney General
Treasurer Public
Treasurer > Corruption 19.34%
Treasurer > Experience 13.15%
Treasurer > Financial Education 14.70%
Treasurer > Fiscal Responsibility 30.37%
Treasurer > Jobs 16.25%
Treasurer > Race/Religion 1.55%
Treasurer > Terrorism 2.32%
Treasurer > Veterans Affairs 2.32%
Treasurer
Auditor Public
Auditor > Corruption 18.36%
Auditor > Crime 3.85%
Auditor > Experience 11.01%
Auditor > Independence 4.90%
Auditor > Infrastructure 2.80%
Auditor > Jobs 10.84%
Auditor > Reform 9.44%
Auditor > Taxes 15.38%
Auditor > Wasteful Spending 23.43%
Auditor
Senate Public
Senate > Budget Deficit 16.13%
Senate > Education 8.96%
Senate > Energy 6.05%
Senate > Foreign Trade 6.49%
Senate > Health Care 14.89%
Senate > Jobs 19.26%
Senate > Military Issues 4.82%
Senate > Reform 7.17%
Senate > Taxes 16.24%
Senate
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Independent Only Public Agenda by Race 
 
County Executive Public
County Executive > Corruption 23.33%
County Executive > Education 7.08%
County Executive > Foreclosures 4.17%
County Executive > Health and Human Services 7.08%
County Executive > Independence 5.42%
County Executive > Jobs 19.17%
County Executive > Leadership/Experience 10.83%
County Executive > Medical Mart 4.31%
County Executive > Public Safety 4.44%
County Executive > Reform 14.17%
County Executive
Public
Governor
Governor > 3C Train 1%
Governor > Education 18%
Governor > Government Efficiency/Size 9%
Governor > Gun Rights 1%
Governor > Health Care 12%
Governor > Jobs 21%
Governor > State Budget 15%
Governor > Taxes 18%
Governor > Veterans Affairs 3%
Governor > Wall Street 2%
Governor
SOS Public
SOS > Election Participation 4%
SOS > Experience 12%
SOS > Fair Elections 13%
SOS > Free Speech Issues 2%
SOS > Government Size/Cost 17%
SOS > Jobs 20%
SOS > Political Background 8%
SOS > Redistricting/Reform 8%
SOS > Taxes 17%
SOS
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AG Public
AG > Abortion 3%
AG > Corruption 24%
AG > Crime/Law Enforcement 22%
AG > Education 11%
AG > Experience 14%
AG > Gun Rights 2%
AG > Jobs 13%
AG > Reform 9%
AG > Wall Street 3%
Attorney General
Treasurer Public
Treasurer > Corruption 18%
Treasurer > Experience 14%
Treasurer > Financial Education 16%
Treasurer > Fiscal Responsibility 31%
Treasurer > Jobs 14%
Treasurer > Race/Religion 3%
Treasurer > Terrorism 3%
Treasurer > Veterans Affairs 2%
Treasurer
Auditor Public
Auditor > Corruption 18%
Auditor > Crime 5%
Auditor > Experience 11%
Auditor > Independence 7%
Auditor > Infrastructure 3%
Auditor > Jobs 8%
Auditor > Reform 10%
Auditor > Taxes 15%
Auditor > Wasteful Spending 23%
Auditor
Senate Public
Senate > Budget Deficit 16%
Senate > Education 10%
Senate > Energy 7%
Senate > Foreign Trade 6%
Senate > Health Care 14%
Senate > Jobs 20%
Senate > Military Issues 4%
Senate > Reform 6%
Senate > Taxes 16%
Senate
County Executive Public
County Executive > Corruption 23%
County Executive > Education 9%
County Executive > Foreclosures 4%
County Executive > Health and Human Services 8%
County Executive > Independence 6%
County Executive > Jobs 18%
County Executive > Leadership/Experience 10%
County Executive > Medical Mart 4%
County Executive > Public Safety 4%
County Executive > Reform 15%
County Executive
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APPENDIX D 
CONVERGENCE SCORES AND VOTE CHOICE 
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Media-Public Convergence 
Total Public Agenda 
 All 
News 
TV 
News 
Newspa
pers 
Ch. 3 Ch. 5 Ch. 8  Ch. 19 
Governo
r 
75 66  81  68  69 61 67 
SOS 72 72 69 73  70  70  71 
AG 63 58 68 53 54 56 68 
Treasure
r 
54 49 53 45 41 52 55 
Auditor 67 62 71 65 58 62 61 
Senate 68 63 72 64 63 59 64 
County 
Executi
ve 
58 49 64 52 50 46 47 
Independents Only 
 All 
News 
TV 
News 
Newspa
pers 
Ch. 3 Ch. 5 Ch. 8  Ch. 19 
Governo
r 77 69 83 70 70 64 69 
SOS 72 74 69 74 72 72 72 
AG 64 59 69 55 56 57 69 
Treasure
r 51 47 50 43 39 51 53 
Auditor 65 60 69 63 56 61 60 
Senate 69 64 74 65 64 59 64 
County 
Executi
ve 57 50 63 53 51 47 48 
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Candidate-Media Convergence 
Total Candidate 
 All 
News 
TV 
News 
Newspapers Ch. 3 Ch. 5 Ch. 8  Ch. 19 
Gv. Kasich 63 54 72 53 59 49 59 
Gv. Strickland 81 79 79 80 81 75 79 
SOS Husted 84 79 84 83 74 76 81 
SOS 
Oshaughnesse
y 
80 79 78 77 74 76 82 
AG Cordray 64 56 72 54 55 54 64 
AG Dewine 65 62 68 56 58 59 70 
Tres. Boyce 72 76 69 76 79
  
71 72 
Tres. Mandel 43 48 40 46 39 56 45 
Aud. Pepper 69 64 70 63 60 63 69 
Aud. Yost 74 67 78 71 63 68 64 
Sen. Fisher 75 72 76 67 74 67 74 
Sen. Portman 65 55 74 56 60 49 56
  
CE. Dolan 62 55 68 57 56 52 53 
CE. Ellison 53 49 58 50 52 46 47 
CE. Fitzgerald 64 58 69 60 60 55 55 
CE. Lanci 55  45 66  47 47 42 44 
CE. 
McCormack 
83 78 79 77 80 75 75 
CE. Scipione 70 67 71 71 67 66 55 
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Candidate Television Only  
 All 
News 
TV 
News 
Newspa
pers 
Ch. 3 Ch. 5 Ch. 8  Ch. 19 
Gv. 
Kasich 38 32 44 32 38 28 33 
Gv. 
Strickl
and 52 44 58 44 49 40 47 
SOS 
Husted 47 42 48 44 40 44 38 
SOS 
Oshau
ghness
ey 33 41 28 36 39 43 45 
AG 
Cordra
y 39 32 46 29 30 31 41 
AG 
Dewin
e 48 43 53 41 45 40 45 
Tres. 
Boyce 64 65 64 61 63 65 66 
Tres. 
Mande
l 49 51 48 50 39 56 49 
Aud. 
Pepper 41 36 43 36 32 34 36 
Aud. 
Yost 64 61 66 65 59 60 55 
Sen. 
Fisher 39 29 50 30 34 24 30 
Sen. 
Portma
n 40 34 47 33 39 30 35 
CE. 
Dolan 34 31 39 31 29 30 33 
CE. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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Ellison 
CE. 
Fitzger
ald 19 12 27 13 11 12 12 
CE. 
Lanci 38 31 46 33 34 29 29 
CE. 
McCor
mack N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
CE. 
Scipio
ne N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Candidate-Public 
Total Candidate, Total Public   TV Candidate, Total Public 
 Public 
Convergenc
e 
 Public 
Convergence 
Gv. Kasich 74 Gv. Kasich 47 
Gv. Strickland 69 Gv. Strickland 47 
SOS Husted 67 SOS Husted 52 
SOS Oshaughnessey 67 SOS 
Oshaughnesse
y 47 
AG Cordray 77 AG Cordray 68 
AG Dewine 84 AG Dewine 60 
Tres. Boyce 37 Tres. Boyce 30 
Tres. Mandel 43 Tres. Mandel 60 
Aud. Pepper 82 Aud. Pepper 59 
Aud. Yost 77  Aud. Yost 70 
Sen. Fisher 71 Sen. Fisher 58 
Sen. Portman 68 Sen. Portman 41 
CE. Dolan 66 CE. Dolan 66 
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CE. Ellison 42 CE. Ellison N/A 
CE. Fitzgerald 48 CE. Fitzgerald 40 
CE. Lanci 62 CE. Lanci 41 
CE. McCormack 53 CE. 
McCormack N/A 
CE. Scipione 51 CE. Scipione N/A 
 
Total Candidate, Independent Public Television Candidate, Independent Public 
 Public 
Convergence 
 Public 
Convergence 
Gv. Kasich 71 Gv. Kasich 46 
Gv. Strickland 72 Gv. Strickland 48 
SOS Husted 68 SOS Husted 53 
SOS 
Oshaughnessey 67 
SOS 
Oshaughnessey 47 
AG Cordray 78 AG Cordray 66 
AG Dewine 84 AG Dewine 60 
Tres. Boyce 36 Tres. Boyce 28 
Tres. Mandel 44 Tres. Mandel 61 
Aud. Pepper 79 Aud. Pepper 61 
Aud. Yost 75 Aud. Yost 67 
Sen. Fisher 73 Sen. Fisher 58 
Sen. Portman 68 Sen. Portman 41 
CE. Dolan 65 CE. Dolan 66 
CE. Ellison 43 CE. Ellison N/A 
CE. Fitzgerald 47 CE. Fitzgerald 38 
CE. Lanci 61 CE. Lanci 39 
CE. McCormack 52 CE. McCormack N/A 
CE. Scipione 51 CE. Scipione N/A 
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Vote Choice 
Total Public    Independents Only 
 Percent of 
Vote  
 Percent of Vote  
Gv. Kasich 71 Gv. Kasich 56 
Gv. Strickland 29 Gv. Strickland 44 
SOS Husted 76 SOS Husted 67 
SOS 
Oshaughnessey 24 
SOS 
Oshaughnessey 33 
AG Cordray 43 AG Cordray 60 
AG Dewine 57 AG Dewine 40 
Tres. Boyce 19 Tres. Boyce 26 
Tres. Mandel 81 Tres. Mandel 74 
Aud. Pepper 37 Aud. Pepper 57 
Aud. Yost 63 Aud. Yost 43 
Sen. Fisher 22 Sen. Fisher 31 
Sen. Portman 78 Sen. Portman 69 
CE. Dolan 52 CE. Dolan 43 
CE. Ellison 1 CE. Ellison 2 
CE. Fitzgerald 17 CE. Fitzgerald 22 
CE. Lanci 16 CE. Lanci 15 
CE. McCormack 9 CE. McCormack 14 
CE. Scipione 4 CE. Scipione 5 
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Condition 1: Total Candidate Agenda, Total Public Agenda 
Hypothesis 2 Test: 
Paired Samples Statistics 
  Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 MPAllNews 63.67 18 7.013 1.653 
CMNewspapers 70.61 18 9.733 2.294 
Pair 2 MPTVNews 57.44 18 8.556 2.017 
CMTVNews 63.50 18 11.633 2.742 
Pair 3 MPNewspapers 67.33 18 7.388 1.741 
CMNewspapers 70.61 18 9.733 2.294 
Pair 4 MPCh.3 58.22 18 9.149 2.157 
CMCh.3 63.56 18 11.947 2.816 
Pair 5 MPCh.5 56.11 18 9.424 2.221 
CMCh.5 63.22 18 11.835 2.790 
Pair 6 MPCh.8 55.33 18 8.246 1.944 
CMCh.8 61.06 18 11.180 2.635 
Pair 7 MPCh.19 58.56 18 9.482 2.235 
CMCh.19 63.56 18 12.373 2.916 
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Paired Samples Test 
  Paired Differences 
t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
  
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  Lower Upper 
Pair 1 MPAllNews - 
CMNewspaper
s 
-6.944 7.627 1.798 -10.737 -3.152 -3.863 17 .001 
Pair 2 MPTVNews - 
CMTVNews 
-6.056 10.773 2.539 -11.413 -.698 -2.385 17 .029 
Pair 3 MPNewspaper
s - 
CMNewspaper
s 
-3.278 7.910 1.864 -7.211 .656 -1.758 17 .097 
Pair 4 MPCh.3 - 
CMCh.3 
-5.333 11.277 2.658 -10.941 .275 -2.006 17 .061 
Pair 5 MPCh.5 - 
CMCh.5 
-7.111 11.702 2.758 -12.930 -1.292 -2.578 17 .020 
Pair 6 MPCh.8 - 
CMCh.8 
-5.722 10.254 2.417 -10.822 -.623 -2.367 17 .030 
Pair 7 MPCh.19 - 
CMCh.19 
-5.000 9.647 2.274 -9.797 -.203 -2.199 17 .042 
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Research Question 1 Test 
Correlations 
  PublicAg
enda Ch.3 Ch.5 Ch.8 Ch.19 AllNews TVNews 
Newspap
ers 
PublicAg
enda 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
1 .015 .023 .034 .362 .284 .084 .473
*
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
.953 .927 .893 .140 .254 .740 .048 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Ch.3 Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.015 1 .926
**
 .938
**
 .835
**
 .932
**
 .971
**
 .729
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.953 
 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Ch.5 Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.023 .926
**
 1 .836
**
 .848
**
 .931
**
 .943
**
 .774
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.927 .000 
 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Ch.8 Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.034 .938
**
 .836
**
 1 .860
**
 .844
**
 .964
**
 .549
*
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.893 .000 .000 
 
.000 .000 .000 .018 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Ch.19 Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.362 .835
**
 .848
**
 .860
**
 1 .896
**
 .920
**
 .730
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.140 .000 .000 .000 
 
.000 .000 .001 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
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AllNews Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.284 .932
**
 .931
**
 .844
**
 .896
**
 1 .933
**
 .904
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.254 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
.000 .000 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
TVNews Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.084 .971
**
 .943
**
 .964
**
 .920
**
 .933
**
 1 .702
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.740 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
.001 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Newspap
ers 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.473
*
 .729
**
 .774
**
 .549
*
 .730
**
 .904
**
 .702
**
 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.048 .001 .000 .018 .001 .000 .001 
 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Hypothesis 3 Test 
Correlations 
  PublicConvergence VotePercent 
PublicConvergence Pearson Correlation 1 .422
*
 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .041 
N 18 18 
VotePercent Pearson Correlation .422
*
 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .041  
N 18 18 
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Correlations 
  PublicConvergence VotePercent 
PublicConvergence Pearson Correlation 1 .422
*
 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .041 
N 18 18 
VotePercent Pearson Correlation .422
*
 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .041  
N 18 18 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
 
Research Question 2 Test 
Correlations 
  PercentV
ote AllNews TVNews 
Newspap
ers Ch.3 Ch.5 Ch.8 Ch.19 
PercentV
ote 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
1 -.162 -.195 -.092 -.200 -.314 -.126 -.026 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
.520 .438 .717 .427 .205 .618 .918 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
AllNews Pearson 
Correlati
on 
-.162 1 .933
**
 .904
**
 .932
**
 .931
**
 .844
**
 .896
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.520 
 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
TVNews Pearson 
Correlati
on 
-.195 .933
**
 1 .702
**
 .971
**
 .943
**
 .964
**
 .920
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.438 .000 
 
.001 .000 .000 .000 .000 
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N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Newspap
ers 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
-.092 .904
**
 .702
**
 1 .729
**
 .774
**
 .549
*
 .730
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.717 .000 .001 
 
.001 .000 .018 .001 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Ch.3 Pearson 
Correlati
on 
-.200 .932
**
 .971
**
 .729
**
 1 .926
**
 .938
**
 .835
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.427 .000 .000 .001 
 
.000 .000 .000 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Ch.5 Pearson 
Correlati
on 
-.314 .931
**
 .943
**
 .774
**
 .926
**
 1 .836
**
 .848
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.205 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
.000 .000 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Ch.8 Pearson 
Correlati
on 
-.126 .844
**
 .964
**
 .549
*
 .938
**
 .836
**
 1 .860
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.618 .000 .000 .018 .000 .000 
 
.000 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Ch.19 Pearson 
Correlati
on 
-.026 .896
**
 .920
**
 .730
**
 .835
**
 .848
**
 .860
**
 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.918 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 
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N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Media-Public, Candidate-Public 
 
Correlations 
  UNCallne
ws 
UNCtvne
ws 
UNCnew
spapers UNCch3 UNCch5 UNCch8 UNCch19 
UNCCan
dPub 
UNCallne
ws 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
1 .946
**
 .899
**
 .951
**
 .978
**
 .844
**
 .806
**
 .684
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .002 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
UNCtvne
ws 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.946
**
 1 .725
**
 .944
**
 .935
**
 .963
**
 .903
**
 .657
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 
 
.001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
UNCnew
spapers 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.899
**
 .725
**
 1 .798
**
 .870
**
 .550
*
 .577
*
 .723
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .001 
 
.000 .000 .018 .012 .001 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
UNCch3 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.951
**
 .944
**
 .798
**
 1 .967
**
 .863
**
 .716
**
 .611
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 
 
.000 .000 .001 .007 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
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UNCch5 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.978
**
 .935
**
 .870
**
 .967
**
 1 .809
**
 .750
**
 .632
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 
 
.000 .000 .005 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
UNCch8 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.844
**
 .963
**
 .550
*
 .863
**
 .809
**
 1 .915
**
 .590
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .018 .000 .000 
 
.000 .010 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
UNCch19 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.806
**
 .903
**
 .577
*
 .716
**
 .750
**
 .915
**
 1 .667
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .012 .001 .000 .000 
 
.002 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
UNCCan
dPub 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.684
**
 .657
**
 .723
**
 .611
**
 .632
**
 .590
**
 .667
**
 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.002 .003 .001 .007 .005 .010 .002 
 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Media-Public, Candidate-Media 
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Condition 2: Television Candidate Agenda, Total Public Agenda 
Hypothesis 2 Test 
 
Paired Samples Statistics 
  Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 MPAllNews 64.80 15 7.173 1.852 
CMAllNews 43.00 15 11.625 3.002 
Pair 2 MPTVNews 59.13 15 8.400 2.169 
CMTVNews 38.93 15 13.220 3.414 
Pair 3 MPNewspapers 68.00 15 7.964 2.056 
CMNewspapers 47.13 15 10.921 2.820 
Pair 4 MPCh.3 59.47 15 9.576 2.472 
CMCh.3 38.53 15 13.071 3.375 
Pair 5 MPCh.5 57.33 15 9.912 2.559 
CMCh.5 38.73 15 12.470 3.220 
Pair 6 MPCh.8 57.20 15 7.757 2.003 
CMCh.8 37.73 15 14.270 3.685 
Pair 7 MPCh.19 60.87 15 8.651 2.234 
CMCh.19 39.60 15 12.614 3.257 
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Paired Samples Test 
  Paired Differences 
t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
  
Mean 
Std. 
Deviatio
n 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  Lower Upper 
Pair 1 MPAllNews - 
CMAllNews 
21.800 13.754 3.551 14.183 29.417 6.139 14 .000 
Pair 2 MPTVNews - 
CMTVNews 
20.200 15.195 3.923 11.785 28.615 5.149 14 .000 
Pair 3 MPNewspapers 
- 
CMNewspapers 
20.867 13.574 3.505 13.349 28.384 5.954 14 .000 
Pair 4 MPCh.3 - 
CMCh.3 
20.933 16.455 4.249 11.821 30.046 4.927 14 .000 
Pair 5 MPCh.5 - 
CMCh.5 
18.600 15.788 4.076 9.857 27.343 4.563 14 .000 
Pair 6 MPCh.8 - 
CMCh.8 
19.467 14.322 3.698 11.535 27.398 5.264 14 .000 
Pair 7 MPCh.19 - 
CMCh.19 
21.267 12.970 3.349 14.084 28.449 6.351 14 .000 
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Research Question 1 
 
Correlations 
  PublicCa
ndidate AllNews TVNews 
Newspap
ers Ch.3 Ch.5 Ch.8 Ch.19 
PublicCa
ndidate 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
1 .095 .053 .106 .099 -.066 .060 .062 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
.736 .852 .706 .726 .815 .831 .825 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
AllNews Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.095 1 .939
**
 .932
**
 .959
**
 .941
**
 .881
**
 .891
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.736 
 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
TVNews Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.053 .939
**
 1 .761
**
 .984
**
 .935
**
 .983
**
 .964
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.852 .000 
 
.001 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Newspap
ers 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.106 .932
**
 .761
**
 1 .808
**
 .842
**
 .662
**
 .715
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.706 .000 .001 
 
.000 .000 .007 .003 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Ch.3 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.099 .959
**
 .984
**
 .808
**
 1 .927
**
 .962
**
 .909
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.726 .000 .000 .000 
 
.000 .000 .000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
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Ch.5 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
-.066 .941
**
 .935
**
 .842
**
 .927
**
 1 .863
**
 .911
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.815 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
.000 .000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Ch.8 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.060 .881
**
 .983
**
 .662
**
 .962
**
 .863
**
 1 .941
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.831 .000 .000 .007 .000 .000 
 
.000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Ch.19 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.062 .891
**
 .964
**
 .715
**
 .909
**
 .911
**
 .941
**
 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.825 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 
 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Hypothesis 3 Test (Excluding non-televised candidates) 
 
Correlations 
  Public PercentVote 
Public Pearson Correlation 1 .377 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .083 
N 15 15 
PercentVote Pearson Correlation .377 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .083  
N 15 18 
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Hypothesis 3 Test (Including non-televised candidates) 
 
Correlations 
  Public PercentVote 
Public Pearson Correlation 1 .658
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .001 
N 18 18 
PercentVote Pearson Correlation .658
**
 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .001  
N 18 18 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
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Research Question 2 Test 
 
 
Correlations 
  PublicCa
ndidate AllNews TVNews 
Newspap
ers Ch.3 Ch.5 Ch.8 Ch.19 
PublicCa
ndidate 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
1 .239 .230 .185 .267 .167 .248 .157 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
.390 .410 .510 .337 .551 .372 .575 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
AllNews Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.239 1 .939
**
 .932
**
 .959
**
 .941
**
 .881
**
 .891
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.390 
 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
TVNews Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.230 .939
**
 1 .761
**
 .984
**
 .935
**
 .983
**
 .964
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.410 .000 
 
.001 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Newspap
ers 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.185 .932
**
 .761
**
 1 .808
**
 .842
**
 .662
**
 .715
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.510 .000 .001 
 
.000 .000 .007 .003 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Ch.3 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.267 .959
**
 .984
**
 .808
**
 1 .927
**
 .962
**
 .909
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.337 .000 .000 .000 
 
.000 .000 .000 
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N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Ch.5 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.167 .941
**
 .935
**
 .842
**
 .927
**
 1 .863
**
 .911
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.551 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
.000 .000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Ch.8 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.248 .881
**
 .983
**
 .662
**
 .962
**
 .863
**
 1 .941
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.372 .000 .000 .007 .000 .000 
 
.000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Ch.19 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.157 .891
**
 .964
**
 .715
**
 .909
**
 .911
**
 .941
**
 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.575 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 
 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Media-Public, Candidate-Public 
 
 
Correlations 
  
allnews tvnews 
newspap
ers ch3 ch5 ch8 ch19 CandPub 
allnews Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
1 .939
**
 .905
**
 .947
**
 .979
**
 .821
**
 .778
**
 .014 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .961 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
tvnews Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.939
**
 1 .724
**
 .948
**
 .940
**
 .956
**
 .879
**
 .033 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 
 
.002 .000 .000 .000 .000 .907 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
newspap
ers 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.905
**
 .724
**
 1 .789
**
 .865
**
 .530
*
 .568
*
 .106 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .002 
 
.000 .000 .042 .027 .706 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
ch3 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.947
**
 .948
**
 .789
**
 1 .964
**
 .863
**
 .687
**
 .012 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 
 
.000 .000 .005 .968 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
ch5 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.979
**
 .940
**
 .865
**
 .964
**
 1 .803
**
 .737
**
 -.023 
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Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 
 
.000 .002 .936 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
ch8 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.821
**
 .956
**
 .530
*
 .863
**
 .803
**
 1 .882
**
 .052 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .042 .000 .000 
 
.000 .853 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
ch19 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.778
**
 .879
**
 .568
*
 .687
**
 .737
**
 .882
**
 1 .104 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.001 .000 .027 .005 .002 .000 
 
.712 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
CandPub Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.014 .033 .106 .012 -.023 .052 .104 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.961 .907 .706 .968 .936 .853 .712 
 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Media-Public, Candidate-Media 
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Condition 3: Total Candidate Agenda, Independent Public Agenda 
 
Hypothesis 2 Test 
Paired Samples Statistics 
  Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 MPAllNews 63.22 18 8.186 1.929 
CMNewspapers 70.61 18 9.733 2.294 
Pair 2 MPTVNews 58.11 18 9.273 2.186 
CMTVNews 63.50 18 11.633 2.742 
Pair 3 MPNewspapers 67.00 18 8.772 2.067 
CMNewspapers 70.61 18 9.733 2.294 
Pair 4 MPCh.3 58.78 18 9.564 2.254 
CMCh.3 63.56 18 11.947 2.816 
Pair 5 MPCh.5 56.67 18 10.152 2.393 
CMCh.5 63.22 18 11.835 2.790 
Pair 6 MPCh.8 56.11 18 8.560 2.018 
CMCh.8 61.06 18 11.180 2.635 
Pair 7 MPCh.19 59.00 18 9.665 2.278 
CMCh.19 63.56 18 12.373 2.916 
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Paired Samples Test 
  Paired Differences 
t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
  
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  Lower Upper 
Pair 1 MPAllNews - 
CMNewspapers 
-7.389 7.845 1.849 -11.290 -3.488 -3.996 17 .001 
Pair 2 MPTVNews - 
CMTVNews 
-5.389 11.142 2.626 -10.929 .152 -2.052 17 .056 
Pair 3 MPNewspapers 
- 
CMNewspapers 
-3.611 8.332 1.964 -7.755 .532 -1.839 17 .083 
Pair 4 MPCh.3 - 
CMCh.3 
-4.778 11.700 2.758 -10.596 1.040 -1.733 17 .101 
Pair 5 MPCh.5 - 
CMCh.5 
-6.556 12.084 2.848 -12.565 -.546 -2.302 17 .034 
Pair 6 MPCh.8 - 
CMCh.8 
-4.944 10.440 2.461 -10.136 .247 -2.009 17 .061 
Pair 7 MPCh.19 - 
CMCh.19 
-4.556 9.666 2.278 -9.363 .251 -1.999 17 .062 
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Research Question 1 Test 
 
Correlations 
  
Public AllNews TVNews 
Newspap
ers Ch.3 Ch.5 Ch.8 Ch.19 
Public Pearson 
Correlati
on 
1 .297 .109 .474
*
 .034 .044 .060 .388 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
.231 .666 .047 .893 .861 .813 .112 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
AllNews Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.297 1 .933
**
 .904
**
 .932
**
 .931
**
 .844
**
 .896
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.231 
 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
TVNews Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.109 .933
**
 1 .702
**
 .971
**
 .943
**
 .964
**
 .920
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.666 .000 
 
.001 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Newspap
ers 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.474
*
 .904
**
 .702
**
 1 .729
**
 .774
**
 .549
*
 .730
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.047 .000 .001 
 
.001 .000 .018 .001 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Ch.3 Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.034 .932
**
 .971
**
 .729
**
 1 .926
**
 .938
**
 .835
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.893 .000 .000 .001 
 
.000 .000 .000 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
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Ch.5 Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.044 .931
**
 .943
**
 .774
**
 .926
**
 1 .836
**
 .848
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.861 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
.000 .000 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Ch.8 Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.060 .844
**
 .964
**
 .549
*
 .938
**
 .836
**
 1 .860
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.813 .000 .000 .018 .000 .000 
 
.000 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Ch.19 Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.388 .896
**
 .920
**
 .730
**
 .835
**
 .848
**
 .860
**
 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.112 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 
 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Hypothesis 3 Test 
Correlations 
  Public VotePercent 
Public Pearson Correlation 1 .466
*
 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .026 
N 18 18 
VotePercent Pearson Correlation .466
*
 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .026  
N 18 18 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
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Research Question 2 Test 
Correlations 
  PercentV
ote AllNews TVNews 
Newspap
ers Ch.3 Ch.5 Ch.8 Ch.19 
PercentV
ote 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
1 -.072 -.080 -.049 -.113 -.210 -.011 .132 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
.778 .753 .847 .655 .402 .966 .602 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
AllNews Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
-.072 1 .933
**
 .904
**
 .932
**
 .931
**
 .844
**
 .896
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.778 
 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
TVNews Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
-.080 .933
**
 1 .702
**
 .971
**
 .943
**
 .964
**
 .920
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.753 .000 
 
.001 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Newspap
ers 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
-.049 .904
**
 .702
**
 1 .729
**
 .774
**
 .549
*
 .730
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.847 .000 .001 
 
.001 .000 .018 .001 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Ch.3 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
-.113 .932
**
 .971
**
 .729
**
 1 .926
**
 .938
**
 .835
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.655 .000 .000 .001 
 
.000 .000 .000 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
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Ch.5 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
-.210 .931
**
 .943
**
 .774
**
 .926
**
 1 .836
**
 .848
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.402 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
.000 .000 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Ch.8 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
-.011 .844
**
 .964
**
 .549
*
 .938
**
 .836
**
 1 .860
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.966 .000 .000 .018 .000 .000 
 
.000 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Ch.19 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.132 .896
**
 .920
**
 .730
**
 .835
**
 .848
**
 .860
**
 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.602 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 
 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Media-Public, Candidate-Public 
 
Correlations 
  INDAllne
ws 
INDtvnew
s 
INDnews
papers INDch3 INDch5 INDch8 INDch19 
INDcand
pub 
INDAllne
ws 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
1 .953
**
 .927
**
 .946
**
 .964
**
 .851
**
 .846
**
 .715
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
INDtvnew
s 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.953
**
 1 .780
**
 .957
**
 .955
**
 .954
**
 .906
**
 .669
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 
 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .002 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
INDnews
papers 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.927
**
 .780
**
 1 .830
**
 .873
**
 .605
**
 .662
**
 .731
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 
 
.000 .000 .008 .003 .001 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
INDch3 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.946
**
 .957
**
 .830
**
 1 .976
**
 .868
**
 .755
**
 .640
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 
 
.000 .000 .000 .004 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
INDch5 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.964
**
 .955
**
 .873
**
 .976
**
 1 .828
**
 .785
**
 .647
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 
 
.000 .000 .004 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
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INDch8 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.851
**
 .954
**
 .605
**
 .868
**
 .828
**
 1 .917
**
 .614
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .008 .000 .000 
 
.000 .007 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
INDch19 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.846
**
 .906
**
 .662
**
 .755
**
 .785
**
 .917
**
 1 .721
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 
 
.001 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
INDcand
pub 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.715
**
 .669
**
 .731
**
 .640
**
 .647
**
 .614
**
 .721
**
 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.001 .002 .001 .004 .004 .007 .001 
 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Media-Public, Candidate-Media 
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Condition 4: Television Candidate Agenda, Independent Public Agenda 
Hypothesis 2 Test 
Paired Samples Statistics 
  
Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Pair 1 MPAllNews 64.47 15 8.450 2.182 
CMAllNews 46.00 15 10.764 2.779 
Pair 2 MPTVNews 59.73 15 9.354 2.415 
CMTVNews 42.00 15 11.784 3.043 
Pair 3 MPNewspapers 67.80 15 9.451 2.440 
CMNewspapers 49.93 15 10.773 2.782 
Pair 4 MPCh.3 59.93 15 10.124 2.614 
CMCh.3 41.67 15 12.111 3.127 
Pair 5 MPCh.5 57.80 15 10.811 2.791 
CMCh.5 42.00 15 11.019 2.845 
Pair 6 MPCh.8 57.93 15 8.224 2.123 
CMCh.8 40.60 15 12.993 3.355 
Pair 7 MPCh.19 61.20 15 9.073 2.343 
CMCh.19 42.47 15 10.623 2.743 
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Paired Samples Test 
  Paired Differences 
t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
  
Mean 
Std. 
Deviatio
n 
Std. Error 
Mean 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  Lower Upper 
Pair 1 MPAllNews - 
CMAllNews 
18.467 15.784 4.075 9.726 27.207 4.531 14 .000 
Pair 2 MPTVNews - 
CMTVNews 
17.733 17.327 4.474 8.138 27.328 3.964 14 .001 
Pair 3 MPNewspapers - 
CMNewspapers 
17.867 15.482 3.997 9.293 26.440 4.470 14 .001 
Pair 4 MPCh.3 - 
CMCh.3 
18.267 18.164 4.690 8.208 28.325 3.895 14 .002 
Pair 5 MPCh.5 - 
CMCh.5 
15.800 17.259 4.456 6.242 25.358 3.546 14 .003 
Pair 6 MPCh.8 - 
CMCh.8 
17.333 16.145 4.169 8.392 26.274 4.158 14 .001 
Pair 7 MPCh.19 - 
CMCh.19 
18.733 15.069 3.891 10.389 27.078 4.815 14 .000 
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Research Question 1 Test 
Correlations 
  
Public AllNews TvNews 
Newspap
ers Ch.3 Ch.5 Ch.8 Ch.19 
Public Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
1 .083 .045 .083 .088 -.078 .055 .056 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
.768 .872 .768 .755 .783 .846 .843 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
AllNews Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.083 1 .939
**
 .932
**
 .959
**
 .941
**
 .881
**
 .891
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.768 
 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
TvNews Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.045 .939
**
 1 .761
**
 .984
**
 .935
**
 .983
**
 .964
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.872 .000 
 
.001 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Newspap
ers 
Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.083 .932
**
 .761
**
 1 .808
**
 .842
**
 .662
**
 .715
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.768 .000 .001 
 
.000 .000 .007 .003 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Ch.3 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.088 .959
**
 .984
**
 .808
**
 1 .927
**
 .962
**
 .909
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.755 .000 .000 .000 
 
.000 .000 .000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
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Ch.5 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
-.078 .941
**
 .935
**
 .842
**
 .927
**
 1 .863
**
 .911
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.783 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
.000 .000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Ch.8 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.055 .881
**
 .983
**
 .662
**
 .962
**
 .863
**
 1 .941
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.846 .000 .000 .007 .000 .000 
 
.000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Ch.19 Pearson 
Correlatio
n 
.056 .891
**
 .964
**
 .715
**
 .909
**
 .911
**
 .941
**
 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.843 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 
 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Hypothesis 3 Test (without non-televised candidates) 
Correlations 
  Public PercentVote 
Public Pearson Correlation 1 .436 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .052 
N 15 15 
PercentVote Pearson Correlation .436 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .052  
N 15 18 
 
 
130 
 
Hypothesis 3 Test (with non-televised candidates) 
 
Correlations 
  Public PercentVote 
Public Pearson Correlation 1 .738
**
 
Sig. (1-tailed)  .000 
N 18 18 
PercentVote Pearson Correlation .738
**
 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000  
N 18 18 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
Research Question 2 
 
Correlations 
  PercentV
ote AllNews TVNews 
Newspap
ers Ch.3 Ch.5 Ch.8 Ch.19 
PercentV
ote 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
1 .161 .152 .089 .150 .045 .181 .157 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
.567 .589 .753 .593 .874 .519 .576 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
AllNews Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.161 1 .939
**
 .932
**
 .959
**
 .941
**
 .881
**
 .891
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.567 
 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
TVNews Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.152 .939
**
 1 .761
**
 .984
**
 .935
**
 .983
**
 .964
**
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Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.589 .000 
 
.001 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Newspap
ers 
Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.089 .932
**
 .761
**
 1 .808
**
 .842
**
 .662
**
 .715
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.753 .000 .001 
 
.000 .000 .007 .003 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Ch.3 Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.150 .959
**
 .984
**
 .808
**
 1 .927
**
 .962
**
 .909
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.593 .000 .000 .000 
 
.000 .000 .000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Ch.5 Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.045 .941
**
 .935
**
 .842
**
 .927
**
 1 .863
**
 .911
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.874 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
.000 .000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Ch.8 Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.181 .881
**
 .983
**
 .662
**
 .962
**
 .863
**
 1 .941
**
 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.519 .000 .000 .007 .000 .000 
 
.000 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Ch.19 Pearson 
Correlati
on 
.157 .891
**
 .964
**
 .715
**
 .909
**
 .911
**
 .941
**
 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.576 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 
 
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Media-Public, Candidate-Public 
Correlations 
  INDtvAlln
ews 
INDtvtvn
ews 
INDtvnew
spapers INDtvch3 INDtvch5 INDtvch8 
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Attorney General:  
Abortion: abortion, right to life, sanctity of life 
Corruption: bill mason, bribe*, corrupt*, di mora, dimora, fraud*, kick back, 
kickback, public official, russo, scheme 
Crime/Law Enforcement: Criminal justice, law, murder, rape, robb* 
Education: classroom, college*, educat*, school*, student*, teacher*, tuition, 
universities 
Experience: congress, experience, politic*, proven, senator, tested, washington 
Gun Rights: 2nd amendment, concealed carry, gun,  hunt*, national rifle association, 
nra, second amendment, sportsm*n 
Jobs: busines*, econom*, great depression, industr*, job, jobless*, labor, 
manufactur*, nafta, out sourc*, outsourc*, over seas, overseas, recession, 
unemploy*,  
Reform: change, re-district*, reapportion*, redistrict*, reform,  
Wall Street: bail out, bailout, bank*, bonus*, corporat*, lehman, wall street 
Auditor:  
Corruption: Bill Mason, Di mora, Dimora, bribe*, corrupt*, fraud*, kick back, 
kickback, public official, russo, scheme 
Crime: crime, criminal, fraud, justice  
Experience: city council, experience, politic*, proven, public service, record, served, 
tested 
Independence: across party line*, bi-partisan*, bipartisan*, democrat* and republican, 
independent, republican and democrat* 
Infrastructure: infrastructure, transportation 
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Jobs: busines*, econom*, great depression, industr*, job, jobless*, jobs, labor, 
manufactur*, nafta, outsourc*, over seas, overseas, recession, unemploy* 
Reform: change, re-district*, reapportion*, redistrict*, reform, reformer  
Taxes: burden, tax* 
Wasteful Spending: big* government, bureaucra*, can‟t afford, cant afford, 
effective*, efficien*, redundant, regulat*, small* government, spend*, spent, 
stimulus, waste* 
County Executive:  
Corruption: Bill Mason, bribe*, corrupt*, di mora, dimora, federal investigator*, 
fraud*, kick back, kickback, public official, russo, scheme 
Education: classroom, college*, education, school*, student*, teacher*, tri-c, tuition, 
universities 
Foreclosures: foreclos*, lost * home* 
Health and Human Services: Clinic, HHS, Health * Human Service*, Metro Health, 
MetroHealth, social work*, socialwork* 
Independence: across party line*, bi-partisan*, bipartisan*, democrat* and republican, 
independent, republican and democrat* 
Jobs: busines*, econom*, great depression, industr*, job, jobless*, jobs, labor, 
manufactur*, nafta, outsourc*, over seas, overseas, recession, unemploy* 
Leadership/Experience: experience, leader*, politic*, proven, public service, record, 
served 
Medical Mart: LMN, MMPI, Med Mart, convention center, medical mart 
Public Safety: crime, criminal, fire fighter*, firefighter*, justice, law, murder, police, 
rape, robb* 
138 
 
Reform: change, progress, reform, reformer 
Governor:  
3C Train: 3 C, 3C, high speed, high-speed, rail 
Education: classroom, college*, education, school*, student*, teacher*, tuition, 
universities 
Government Efficiency/Size: big government, bureaucra*, can‟t afford, cant afford, 
effective*, efficien*, redundant, regulat*, small* government, spend*, spent, 
waste 
Gun Rights: 2nd amendment, concealed carry, gun, hunt*, national rifle association, 
nra, second amendment, sportsm*n 
Health Care: *existing condition, disease*, doctor*, frivolous lawsuit*, health*, 
hospital*, medica*, obama care, obamacare 
Jobs: busines*, depression, econom*, industr*, job, jobless*, jobs, labor, 
manufactur*, nafta, outsourc*, over seas, overseas, recession, unemploy* 
State Budget: bi-ennium, biennium, budget, cutback*, cuts, debt, deficit, short fall, 
shortfall, spending 
Taxes: burden, tax* 
Veterans Affairs: Afghanistan, Air Force, Army, Iraq, Marine*, Military, National 
Guard, Navy, Troops, Veteran 
Wall Street: bail out, bailout, bank*, bonus*, corporat*, lehman, wall street 
Senate: 
Budget Deficit: budget, debt, deficit*, live within * means, spend* 
Education: classroom, college*, education, school*, student*, teacher*, tuition, 
universities 
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Energy: bio-fuel*, cap * trade, coal, energy, foreign oil, natural gas, nuclear power, 
sustainability 
Foreign Trade: foreign trade, nafta, outsourc*, over seas, overseas, trade deficit, trade 
lobb* 
Health Care: *existing condition, disease*, doctor*, frivolous lawsuit*, health*, 
hospital*, medica*, obama care, obamacare 
Jobs: Busines*, econom*, great depression, industr*, job, jobless*, jobs, labor, 
manufactur*, recession, unemploy* 
Military Issues: Afghanistan, Air Force, Army, Defense, Iraq, Marine*, Military, 
National Guard, Navy, Troops, Veteran, Veterans 
Reform: change, re-district*, reapportion*, redistrict*, reform, reformer 
Taxes: burden, tax* 
Secretary of State: 
Election Participation: disenfranchise*, registered voter*, turn out, turnout, voter 
registration 
Experience: experience*, proven, record, tested 
Fair Elections: fair, fairness, open election*, trust 
Free Speech Issues: 1st amendment, first amendment, free speech 
Government Size/Cost: big* government, bureaucra*, can‟t afford, cant afford, 
effective*, efficien*, redundant, regulat*, small* government, spend*, spent, 
stimulus, waste 
Jobs: busines*, econom*, great depression, industr*, job, jobless*, jobs, labor, 
manufactur*, nafta, out sourc*, outsourc*, over seas, overseas, recession, 
unemploy* 
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Political Background: city council, clerk, elected, Ohio house, Ohio senate, politic*, 
ran for office, represent*, serves, state senate 
Redistricting/Reform: change, re-district*, reapportion*, redistrict*, reform 
Taxes: burden, tax* 
Treasurer: 
Corruption: Bill Mason, Bribe*, Corrupt*, Di mora, Dimora, Russo, fraud*, kick 
back, kickback, public official, scheme 
Experience: politician*, proven, record, representative, tested 
Financial Education: Financial Education 
Fiscal Responsibility: responsib*, trust* 
Jobs: busines*, econom*, great depression, industr*, job, jobless*, jobs, labor, 
manufactur*, nafta, outsourc*, over seas, overseas, recession, unemploy* 
Race/Religion: African American, Arab, bigot*, Christian, mosque, Muslim 
Terrorism: Terror*, middle east 
Veterans Affairs: Afghanistan, Air Force, Army, Iraq, Marine*, Military, National 
Guard, Navy, Troops, Veteran 
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The 2010 general election in Cuyahoga County was marked a myriad of issues that 
impacted the context of the election. A brief description of these contextual issues 
follows: 
Global Economic Recession: The global economic recession that began in 2007 was 
still having a strong effect on the population of Cuyahoga County. Joblessness was at 
very high levels and the local economy was stagnant. As a result of this recession, 
economic issues – especially jobs – were a dominant issue in the campaign.  
Tea Party: In 2009, spurred on by large budget deficits, bank bailouts and other 
government spending which was perceived as wasteful, a group of vocal, fiscally 
conservative voters emerged as the “Tea Party.” This loosely organized group, which 
tends towards the conservative extremes of the Republican Party, did play a major role in 
this election nationwide. Their impact and focus varied greatly across the country 
however they were generally considered deficit hawks with a strong, ideological 
viewpoint. Many of “Tea Partiers” considered themselves to be more independent, 
because of a general dissatisfaction with both the Democratic and Republican parties; 
however, these groups do tend to self-identify as very conservative.  
Budget Deficits: Nationally, the budget deficit in 2010 was several times larger than 
the previous historic high as a result of various spending measures passed by a 
Democratically controlled Congress and President, this issue heavily favored Republicans 
going into the election. In Ohio, the state was projected to have an $8 billion budget 
deficit in the next 2-year budget cycle and the incumbent Governor Ted Strickland had 
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balanced the previous budget using Federal Stimulus funds and by reallocating funds 
from dedicated state trust funds in the previous biennium.  
Corruption: In late July 2008, the FBI raided the homes and offices of dozens of 
elected officials and holders of public contracts related to the Cuyahoga County 
Commissioners office. The investigation focused on a racketeering operation led by 
County Commissioner Jimmy Dimora and County Auditor Frank Russo. As a result of 
this corruption, a new county charter was passed in 2009 and the 2010 election marked 
the formation of a new county government structure including a new County Executive 
and County Council, neither of these positions had previously existed. The electorate was 
notably weary of corruption in certain areas; however, this concern did not translate 
across all races. A judicial candidate who had been arrested and indicted by the FBI in 
September 2010 still managed to receive 47% of the countywide vote. 
Additional Contextual Notes 
Nationally, 2010 was a strong Republican year; it marked one of the largest 
partisan power shifts in the U.S. House of Representatives in history. That shift in 
partisan power was also felt nationally in state elections where several incumbent 
Democrats lost re-election bids to challenging Republicans. This is likely a result of 
Democratic victories in 2006 and 2008, which were based on the promises of more jobs, 
a higher quality of life and strong anti-George Bush sentiment. With the failure of 
incumbent policies to deal create jobs and a higher quality of life and the impact of the 
global economic recession, the balance rapidly shifted to Republicans.  
Description of Individual Elections 
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Governor‟s Race: Ted Strickland (D) (incumbent) vs. John Kasich (R)  
 Incumbent Governor Ted Strickland was elected to an open seat in 2006, 
defeating Republican Kenneth Blackwell on the premise of his “Turnaround Ohio” 
campaign. This message was based on several years of Republican control of the Ohio‟s 
Governorship, mounting economic difficulties and anti-Republican sentiment brought on 
nationally by anti-George W. Bush sentiment. Upon election, Strickland ran into budget 
problems in the 2007-2008 biennium which were brought on by the global economic 
recession; Strickland balanced this budget by taking funds from the state tobacco 
settlement fund and other dedicated state trusts. Facing additional deficits in the 2009-
2010 biennium, Strickland relied heavily of Federal Stimulus funds to close the budget 
gap. During his first term, the state of Ohio lost over 400,000 jobs including several 
major employers relocating their headquarters and significant field operations from Ohio 
to other states.  
 The challenger John Kasich was a former U.S. Congressman who was chairman 
of the House Budget Committee in 1997 and was credited as a primary architect of the 
last balanced federal budget. After leaving Congress, Kasich took a job as the managing 
director at Lehman Brothers, a Wall Street bank which collapsed early in the recession 
causing economic turmoil. Kasich was also well known as a contributor to the 
conservative cable news network Fox News.  
Ohio Secretary of State: Jon Husted (R) vs. Maryellen O‟Shaughnessey (D) 
 This race was for an open seat, the incumbent Democrat Jennifer Brunner did not 
run for re-election in order to pursue a failed bid for the Democratic nomination for U.S. 
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Senate. Maryellen O‟Shaughnessey was the Democratic selection to run for the seat to 
replace Brunner, the highest office she had held was Clerk of Courts for Franklin County 
and had previously served as a city councilwoman in Columbus and ran an unsuccessful 
bid for the U.S. House of Representatives in 2000.  
Jon Husted was considered an up-and-coming Republican who had served as a 
member of the Ohio House of Representatives, where he served as Speaker of the House 
two terms before moving up to the Ohio Senate. 
Attorney General Race: Richard Cordray (D) (Incumbent) vs. Mike Dewine (R)  
Incumbent Richard Cordray was elected the State Treasurer‟s office in 2006; 
however when the seat for Attorney General was vacated in 2008 due to a sex scandal 
involving Marc Dann, Cordray ran for and was elected to fill the remaining two years of 
the term. Cordray had widespread support of police and firefighters and built a strong, but 
not very vocal, image of having restored integrity to the office.  
Mike Dewine was a former U.S. Senator, Lt. Governor of Ohio, member of the 
U.S. House of Representatives and a State Senator with a combined 26 years of service in 
an elected office. Dewine‟s brother, Kevin Dewine, was the chairman of the Ohio 
Republican Party. During the primary, Kevin negotiated a deal with Dave Yost to end a 
primary challenge to Mike‟s candidacy in exchange for party support for Yost in the 
Auditor race.  
Treasurer race: Kevin Boyce (D) (Incumbent) vs. Josh Mandel (R) 
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 After Richard Cordray was elected to take the office of Attorney General, 
Governor Ted Strickland appointed Kevin Boyce, an African-American to fill the 
remaining term in the Treasurer‟s office. Prior to his appointment as Treasurer, Boyce 
had been a Columbus City Councilman for nine years. His opponent, Josh Mandel a 
Jewish Republican from Cuyahoga County had served in the Ohio House of 
Representatives for two terms, as a Lyndhurst City Councilman and  he was a decorated 
Marine veteran who served two tours of duty in Iraq. During this election, Mandel ran a 
series of ads accusing Boyce of giving a job with access to sensitive information to the 
wife of a political ally and further accusing Boyce of only advertising that job at the 
mosque that the eventual hire and her husband belonged to. This resulted in accusations 
that Mandel, a Jewish Marine, was trying to portray Boyce as a Muslim. This forced 
Boyce to run a series of ads in self-defense, portraying himself as a Christian and 
attacking Mandel over the allegations.  
Auditor Race: Dave Yost (R) vs. David Pepper (D) 
 The incumbent in this race was Mary Taylor, who had pulled out of the Auditor 
race to run for Lt. Governor. Dave Yost had previously been an aggressive candidate in 
the Attorney General race, who had gained early support of the Tea Party, who disliked 
Mike Dewine. After the deal was struck to push Yost into the Auditor race, the Tea Party 
revolted against Yost throwing their support behind Seth Morgan, despite this Yost easily 
won the nomination. Yost had previously served as Delaware County Auditor and 
prosecuting attorney.  
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 David Pepper is a former Cincinnati City Councilman and Hamilton County 
Commissioner. Pepper had also run unsuccessfully for Cincinnati Mayor. Pepper relied 
heavily on wordplay surrounding his last name in branding his campaign, although his 
advertisements did pepper in several various issue mentions. 
United States Senate: Rob Portman (R) vs. Lee Fisher (D) 
 This race was for the seat held by retiring Republican Senator George Voinovich. 
Rob Portman was a former member of the U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Trade 
Representative and a Director of the Office of Management and Budget under George W. 
Bush. Lee Fisher was the sitting Lt. Governor of Ohio where he had been placed directly 
in charge of job creation efforts by Ted Strickland. Fisher had also previously served in 
the Ohio State Legislature and as Attorney General; however he had not held elective 
office since 1995. In 1998, Fisher ran unsuccessfully for Ohio Governor. Fisher‟s 
campaign was not well funded in the final weeks of the election, resulting in a low 
quantity of ads coming from his camp. 
Cuyahoga County Executive race: Matt Dolan (R) vs. David Ellison (G) vs. Ed Fitzgerald 
(D) vs. Ken Lanci (I) vs. Tim McCormack (I) vs. Don Scipione (I) 
 As mentioned earlier, this race was for a newly created position in Cuyahoga 
County that was created as a result of a charter amendment in response to an FBI 
investigation of County Commissioner Jimmy Dimora and County Auditor Frank Russo. 
Both Dimora and Russo were leaders in the Cuyahoga County Democratic Party. 
 Matt Dolan was a sitting member of the Ohio House of Representatives whose 
district covered only a very small corner of Cuyahoga County, he is also the son of the 
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owners of the Cleveland Indians. Dolan was widely considered a moderate Republican 
and an outsider to Cuyahoga County politics. David Ellison is an architect and member of 
the Green Party, Ellison lacked any political experience waged an aggressive campaign 
with limited resources. 
 Ed Fitzgerald was the sitting Mayor of Lakewood, a large, liberal suburb of 
Cleveland and he was a former FBI agent. Fitzgerald was named in the FBI probe of 
Cuyahoga County government as Public Official #14, though he was not accused of any 
crime. He relied heavily on his experience as a former FBI agent to deflect concerns 
about corruption while relying heavily on the remains of the Cuyahoga County 
Democratic Party‟s political machine and grassroots network to deliver votes.  
 Ken Lanci was businessman and self-described turnaround expert who owned 
several printing businesses in Cleveland. A self-made millionaire, Lanci ran on the 
premise of being a total independent with no ties to either political party and on his 
business experience. Lanci vowed to work for a salary of $1 and spent incredible sums of 
money putting his name and orange face on every bus and billboard in the county. While 
he quietly spent a lot of time learning about the key issues in the race, he did not 
communicate adequately on those issues, instead focusing on his independence.  
 Tim McCormack was a former County Commissioner and a long time moderate 
Democrat. McCormack did not run an aggressive campaign and appeared to be 
attempting to win on name recognition alone. Lastly, Don Scipione was a scientist and 
small business owner who was involved in developing the charter amendment that 
created the position of County Executive. Scipione did not run an aggressive campaign, 
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though he did buy some billboards and radio spots on niche channels in the last few 
weeks of the campaign.  
 This race was tinged with several interesting contextual elements, first it was for a 
new position with undefined yet lofty expectations. The county was a financial mess after 
decades of mismanagement, kickbacks and schemes at the hands of Dimora and Russo. 
In addition, Cuyahoga County was one of the hardest hit areas in the nation by the 
foreclosure crisis of 2008-2011, the county had the highest sales tax rate in Ohio and it 
had the largest number of municipalities (59) in any single county in the state. These 
inefficiencies, corruption and patronage hiring resulted in a state of financial and 
operational crisis for Cuyahoga County. 
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Convergence Score: The degree to which two agendas, measured in terms of percentage 
of salience, are similar. Convergence is expressed as a number between 0 and 100, 
where a score of 100 indicates that the agendas are identical and 0 indicates that the 
agendas are entirely different.  
Media-Public Convergence: The convergence score between the media agenda and the 
public agenda. This convergence score can be considered a measurement of 
traditional agenda setting effects. In other words, the relative weight for given issues 
in the media as determined by content analyses is matched by the relative importance 
attributed to issues in the general public as measured by the survey in which voters 
indicated the importance of issues.  In this analysis, the media-public convergence 
was analyzed on a race-by-race basis due to the fact that the issues, the media‟s 
agenda and the public‟s agenda remained constant within the context of any one 
given race. 
Candidate-Media Convergence: The convergence score between the candidate agenda 
and the media agenda. This convergence score can be considered a measurement of 
candidate-media agenda setting effects. In this analysis, the candidate-media 
convergence was analyzed on a candidate-by-candidate basis due to the fact that 
while the media agenda remained constant through a given race, each candidate‟s 
agenda was unique.  
Candidate-Public Convergence: The convergence score between the candidate agenda 
and the public agenda. This convergence score can be considered a measurement of 
candidate-public agenda setting effects. In this analysis candidate-public convergence 
was analyzed on a candidate-by-candidate basis due to the fact that while the public 
agenda remained constant through a given race, each candidate‟s agenda was unique.  
